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IMAGINING THE UNIMAGINABLE:  
TORTURE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 
Francesca Laguardia* 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines use of torture by the U.S. government in the context 
of the late 20th century preventive turn in criminal justice. Challenging the 
assumption that the use of “enhanced interrogation tactics” in the war on terror 
was an exceptional deviation from accepted norms, this article suggests that this 
deviation began decades before the terror attacks, in the context of conventional 
criminal procedure. I point to the use of the “ticking time bomb hypothetical,” 
and its connection to criminal procedure’s “kidnapping hypothetical.” Using 
case law and criminal procedure textbooks I trace the employment of that 
narrative over several decades, prior to 2001, including growing support for the 
use of physical brutality in obtaining information from criminal suspects. Far 
from “unimaginable,” I argue that the use of torture had been imagined, and 
gained increasing acceptance, in the increasingly preventive focus of these 
standard criminal procedural debates. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the United States began detaining “enemy combatants” at the 
Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility, it seemed to many that “the unthinkable had 
become thinkable.”1 Civil and human rights advocates decried the policy as a 
radical departure from both human rights norms and prior U.S. practice.2 The 
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1.  Jeremy Waldron, Torture Terror and Tradeoffs: Philosophy for the Whitehouse 222 
(2010); David Luban, Unthinking the Ticking Time Bomb, in Global Basic Rights 181 (Charles 
Beitz & Robert Goodin eds., 2009). 
2.  See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror 
Turned into a War on American Ideals (2008) (discussing the legal and political underpinnings 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2608548 
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revelation that the United States was engaging in torture, by CIA agents and via 
the intelligence services of proxy countries, served only to heighten the tenor of 
the criticism.3 The controversy has since returned to the forefront of the U.S. 
policy debate with the release of the declassified executive summary of the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence report on the use of torture by the CIA.4 
However, some scholars have challenged the notion that the “new” 
counterterrorism practices were such a complete departure from the “old” 
counterterrorism regime. Some pointed to the history of indefinite detention of 
immigrants,5 while others argued that the new policies were merely reflections of 
the increase in punitive policies that had begun in the 1970s.6 Still more noted 
changes within American criminal justice policies, arguing that U.S. military and 
criminal justice policies were converging on a single system of justice that 
embraced certain War on Terror practices.7 
The individual developments noted in the studies above were either 
presented without reference to broader criminal justice developments8 or relied 
upon the vague and overwhelming notion that the United States had become more 
                                                                                                                       
of the War on Terror); Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Rumsfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal of 
American Values (2008) (analyzing the Bush administration’s complicity in acts of torture as a 
departure from the principles and values set forth in the Geneva Convention and the Torture 
Convention); David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the 
War on Terror (2002) (asserting that the U.S. government’s use of torture  in the name of the 
War on Terror violated the civil liberties of  non-U.S. citizens). 
3.  See, e.g., Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s 
“Extraordinary Rendition” Program, New Yorker, Feb. 14, 2005 (describing the rendition 
program); Sarah Joseph, Rendering Terrorists and the Convention Against Torture, 5 Hum. Rts. 
L. Rev. 339 (2005) (discussing the conflict between the practice of rendering terrorists and the 
Convention Against Torture); Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: 
Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 309 (2005) 
(criticizing the practice of extraordinary rendition as violative of the Geneva Conventions). 
4.  S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program Executive Summary (2014) [hereinafter Senate 
Report]. 
5.  David Cole & James Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil 
Liberties in the Name of National Security (2006). 
6.  John T. Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive Interrogation, and Civil Rights 
Litigation after Chavez v. Martinez, 39 Ga. L. Rev. 733 (2005); Colin Dayan, The Story of Cruel 
and Unusual (2007); James Forman, Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Made the 
War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 331 (2009). 
7.  John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 
765 (2007); Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal 
and Military Detention Models, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1079 (2007). 
8.  See Parry, supra note 6 (discussing Miranda rights and torture without reference to 
broader criminological culture); Dayan, supra note 6 (analyzing the development of Eighth 
Amendment doctrine); Parry, supra note 7; Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 7 (discussing 
militarization of criminal procedure). 
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“punitive,” leading to a popular acceptance of torture practices.9 The “punitive” 
arguments assert a connection between the phenomenon of mass incarceration and 
the acceptance of torture—a leap that is not easily made.10 They further rely on 
the overly general idea that the U.S. public has become bloodthirsty, which fails 
to explain why some detainees were tortured, while others were merely detained. 
In this article, I argue that all of these developments are better explained 
via reference to the overarching shift in criminal justice policies, away from 
checks on law enforcement in favor of the prevention of harm—ultimately leading 
to a devaluation of the presumption of innocence. I argue that, similar to this shift 
in criminal justice tactics, torture may be seen as the result of a gradual change in 
popular U.S. expectations regarding government, as evidenced by increasing 
acceptance of torture-tolerant narratives in criminal procedure doctrine and 
education.  These changes in expectations in turn resulted in a new logic, a way 
of weighing interests when analyzing the use of torture that reflected the newly 
lessened value of formerly fundamental norms, and ignored others entirely. I call 
this reasoning—a reasoning that frames the question of when and whether to use 
physical abuse in a way that requires an approving answer—the logic of torture. 
The origin of the logic of torture, and rationalization of its use, in the 
conventional criminal context carries severe implications. It indicates that 
proponents and critics alike are missing the true character of our use of torture. 
Our rationalization of torture was not an exceptional response to either an 
unprecedented risk or an unreasonable panic—rather, it arose as a response to the 
more banal challenges of everyday policing. The use of torture, therefore, is 
unlikely to stay buried in the domain of counterterrorism, and cannot be 
explained, defended, or prevented from recurrence if our understanding of it is 
limited to that extraordinary context. Its acceptance was not exceptional, and there 
is little reason to think that its use will remain exceptional for long. 
This article begins with an analysis of the preventive turn in criminal 
procedure. Part II outlines the salient aspects of the preventive turn, and the way 
in which it alters accepted norms and priorities in criminal justice. I focus in 
particular on the movement in the criminal law towards avoiding possible harms, 
and the tension this creates with the traditional balance of considerations in 
criminal justice in order to eliminate concerns about defendants’ rights and 
undermine the accepted norm that state action should be taken only when the state 
is confident that harm will occur if it does not act. Following Peter Ramsay,11 I 
                                                                                                                       
9.  Forman, supra note 6. 
10.  See Forman, supra note 6 (using the exceptional rates of incarceration in the United 
States, as well as rhetoric regarding incarceration, to argue that the use of torture in the “war on 
terror” is an outgrowth of American punitiveness). 
11.  Peter Ramsay, Imprisonment Under the Precautionary Principle, in Seeking 
Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 193 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis 
eds., 2012). 
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refer to this practice as employment of the “precautionary principle,” which 
allows extreme government action in response to a mere possibility of harm.12 
Once I have established the primary aspects of the preventive turn, I 
discuss the way in which the use of torture, and discussion of torture, can be 
reimagined as part of this turn. I assert that both the primary justification for 
torture, the ticking time bomb hypothetical, and criticisms of that justification, 
show the way in which the discussion of torture is in fact a discussion of the 
propriety of applying the precautionary principle and a preventive framework. In 
doing so I engage with the concept of the “ticking time bomb scenario,” its logical 
flaws, and the way in which these flaws have been highlighted by recent terror 
threats and the practices of the CIA. 
In Part III, I turn to the history of this logic and its increasing acceptance 
over time, prior to the terror attacks of 2001. Rather than a panicked response to 
terrorism, I show that the narratives justifying torture were gaining acceptance in 
appellate criminal cases, particularly within the discussion of the extent of 
Miranda rights and also in the context of the due process rights of suspects and 
convicts (in the development of the “shocks the conscience” standard). Here I 
look not only to case law, but also to accepted norms and evolving exceptions as 
represented by the description of doctrine in criminal procedure textbooks. 
In Part IV, I conclude by highlighting the most salient features of the 
judicial decisions and their descriptions in criminal procedure textbooks. I find 
that rather than “thinking the unthinkable,” the use of torture, and narratives 
defending its use, were well thought out long before the 2001 “emergency.” I 
argue that this implies two important points: first, that the use of torture, having 
developed its justification in the sphere of domestic criminal justice, is unlikely 
to remain isolated in the quasi-international arena of counterterrorism and; 
second, that proponents of human rights might do well to focus less on 
exceptionalism and more on the domestic norms that appear to have given rise to 
the problem in the first place. 
                                                                                                                       
12.  The precautionary principle emerged in the context of environmental law. Ramsay 
uses the principle as an explanation of the risk-averse, preventive turn in criminal law, which 
has been noted by numerous scholars. For discussion of the preventive turn in criminal law see 
generally, Ramsay, supra note  
11 (discussing the precautionary principle); Lucia Zedner, Pre-crime and  
Post-criminology?, 11 Theoretical Criminology 261 (2007) (analyzing the shift from a post-
crime to pre-crime society); Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice (2014) 
(discussing the principles and values that should guide preventative criminal measures). 
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II. THE LOGIC OF PREVENTION AND THE LOGIC OF TORTURE 
A. Prevention 
For several decades, sociologists and sociolegal scholars have been 
noting a preventive turn in criminal justice.13 Many descriptions of this 
development have focused on the movement of the criminal justice system from 
a position of reactive punishment to one of risk management14 and from a focus 
on individuals to management of populations.15 Tactics employed as part of this 
development include the policing of schools, the increasing use of stop-and-frisk, 
and the use of population-based risk assessment tools in determining criminal 
sentences.16 
Other scholars focus on the continuous development of  
quasi-criminal civil interventions, such as the use of control orders in the United 
Kingdom, or the use of mental health (or other) statutes in order to preventively 
detain individuals who are believed to be “dangerous.”17 Still more scholars 
                                                                                                                       
13.  Malcolm M. Feeley & Johnathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging 
Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 Criminology 449 (1992); Ulrich Beck, Risk 
Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992); Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild 
Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive Detention, 86 J. Crim. L. &. Criminology 778 (1996); 
Carol S. Steiker, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 771 (1998); 
Gordon Hughes, Understanding Crime Prevention: Social Control, Risk and Late Modernity 
(1998); Paul Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventative Detention as 
Criminal Justice, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1429 (2001); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of 
Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (2003); Eric Janus, The Preventive State, Terrorists and 
Sexual Predators: Countering the Threat of a New Outsider Jurisprudence, 40 Crim. L. Bull. 
576 (2004); Jude McCulloch & Bree Carlton, Preempting Justice: Suppression of Financing of 
Terrorism and the ‘War on Terror,’ 17 Current Issues in Crim. Just. 397 (2005); Eric Janus, 
Failure to Protect: America’s Sexual Predator Laws and the Rise of the Preventive State (2006); 
Richard V. Ericson, Crime in an Insecure World (2007); Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice or 
Pre-Punishment? The Case of Control Orders, 60 Current Legal Problems 174 (2007); Bernard 
Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (2007); 
Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American 
Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (2007); Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Defending 
the Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing Character of Crime, Procedure, and Sanctions, 
2 Crim. L. and Phil. 21 (2008); Ashworth & Zedner, supra note 12. 
14.  See Simon, supra note 13; see also Feeley & Simon, supra note 13, at 452 (describing 
a “new” penology that is more concerned with techniques to identify, classify, and manage 
groupings sorted by dangerousness in order to regulate levels of deviance, and not to respond to 
individual deviants); Harcourt, supra note 13; Ericson, supra note 13. 
15.  See Harcourt, supra note 13. 
16.  See Harcourt, supra note 13. 
17.  See Janus, Failure to Protect, supra note 13 (arguing that sexual predator laws are 
signs of a preventive state in which the government casts wide nets of surveillance and 
intervenes to curtail liberty before crimes of any type occur); see also Ian Dennis, Security, Risk, 
and Preventive Orders, in Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 
169 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012) (discussing the use of civil preventive orders to 
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emphasize the criminalization of increasingly preparatory acts in order to prevent 
criminal activity.18 These statutes may include, for instance, provision of aid to 
terrorists in the form of providing safe harbor, expertise, or financial support.19 
Such statutes, criminalizing everything from the provision of money to the 
provision of “expert advice,”20 have been the most commonly invoked federal 
criminal terrorism statutes used in terrorism prosecutions in the United States.21 
                                                                                                                       
provide security from the harm thought to be presented by the people subject to these orders);  
John Stanton-Ife, Preventive Detention at the Margins of Autonomy, in, Seeking Security: Pre-
Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 143 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012) 
(discussing the use of mental disorders as a reason for compulsory civil detentions); Martin 
Wasik, The Test for Dangerousness, in Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of 
Criminal Harms 243 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012) (analyzing different measures of 
dangerousness for protective sentencing of offenders aged eighteen and over); Lucia Zedner, 
Erring on the Side of Safety: Risk Assessment, Expert Knowledge, and the Criminal Court, in 
Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 219 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian 
Dennis eds., 2012) (assessing the use of individuals as risk subjects within the criminal court); 
Larry Alexander & Kimberly Ferzan, Danger: The Ethics of Preemptive Action, 9 Ohio St. J. 
Crim. L. 637 (2011) (setting out defensible grounds for preventive restrictions of liberty for 
“responsible but dangerous” actors); Michael Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants, 
and Preventive Detention, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 77 (2005) (describing the use of preventive detention 
of sexual predators, undesirable aliens, the mentally ill, and unlawful combatants); Adam 
Crawford, Governing Through Anti-social Behaviour, Regulatory Challenges to Criminal 
Justice, 49 British J. Criminology 810 (2009) (arguing that Britain’s new anti-social behavior 
agenda brought in regulatory tools that are used to circumvent and erode established criminal 
justice principles; Janus, The Preventive State, supra note 13 (describing how governmental 
social control and “radical prevention” policies are being used to identify “dangerous” people 
and deprive them of their liberty preventively); McCulloch & Carlton, supra note 13 (using 
suppression of financing of terrorism legislation to argue that these preventive measures erode 
and sometimes reverse the presumption of innocence and lead to radical injustice); see also 
Slobogin, supra note 13 (analyzing the degree of dangerousness necessary to justify preventive 
detention); see also Zedner, Preventive Justice or Pre-Punishment?, supra note 13 (describing 
the United Kingdom’s use of Control Orders and the way they side-step the criminal process to 
impose burdensome restrictions ahead of any wrongdoing). 
18.  See Kimberley Ferzan & Larry Alexander, Risk and Inchoate Crimes: Retribution or 
Prevention?, in Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 103 (G.R. 
Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012); Jeremy Horder, Harmless Wrongdoing and the Anticipatory 
Perspective on Criminalisation (2012); Andrew Simester, Prophylactic Crimes, in Seeking 
Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 61 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 
2012); Kimberly Ferzan, Inchoate Crimes at the Prevention/Punishment Divide, 48 San Diego 
L. Rev. 1273 (2011); McCulloch & Carlton, supra note 13. 
19.  See McCulloch & Carlton, supra note 13; Ferzan & Alexander, supra note 18; 
Simester, supra note 18. Statutes criminalizing the provision of material support to terrorists 
provide examples of such statutes from the U.S. perspective. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339(a)–(d) 
(2002). 
20.  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the “expert advice or assistance” prong of material support). 
21.  See Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, Jr., Human Rights First, In Pursuit of 
Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts 11 (2009), available at 
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As Carole Steiker has noted, the tendency to study each of these 
developments individually has undermined scholars’ ability to recognize and 
respond to the overarching trend towards prevention in criminal justice, and its 
ramifications, in spite of general agreement among these authors that the cause of 
each development is in fact a focus on preventing (rather than responding to) 
harm.22 Yet just the brief summary of tactics offered above highlights the ubiquity 
of preventive practices. This ubiquity, in turn, suggests a broad legal cultural 
development, a revolution of priorities in criminal justice, rather than a series of 
responses to unique problems. 
Of course, it must be acknowledged that criminal justice was always 
preventive in some sense.23 One purpose of punishment is to deter future crime, 
and surely crime prevention was always one aspect of efforts to incapacitate 
criminals as well.24 But the current preventive turn notably evades due process 
protections, which although perhaps merely half a century old, have come to be 
seen as fundamental to modern conceptions of justice and fairness.25 Quasi-
criminal detention, for instance, offers the state the ability to detain individuals 
while circumventing standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or, in the case 
of control orders and other responses to terrorism, the right to see and respond to 
evidence against oneself.26 By detaining without proving guilt, the state threatens 
the very existence of the presumption of innocence.27 
The legal philosophical critique put forward by legal philosophers, who 
have perhaps done the most work on the preventative turn in criminal justice, 
offers an excellent explanation of how the purpose and limits of criminal justice 
interventions have changed in recent years. Under what might be considered a 
traditional view of criminal justice interventions, the state refrains from imposing 
on an individual unless and until some imposition is known to be necessary, such 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/090723-LS-in-pursuit-justice-09-
update.pdf. 
22.  See Steiker, supra note 13, at 778. 
23.  Ashworth & Zedner, Preventive Justice, supra note 12, at 11, 17, 21,  
27–50; Ashworth & Zedner, Just Prevention: Preventive Rationales and the Limits of the 
Criminal Law, in Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law 279, 279 (Robin Duff & Stuart 
Green eds., 2011) (“We also assume that the prevention of harm is one of the rationales of the 
criminal law.”). 
24.  See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A 
Retrospective on the Last Century and Some Thoughts about the Next, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 1 
(2003) (stating that “the textbook purposes of criminal punishment” are “retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation”). 
25.  See, e.g., Magnus Ulväng, Criminal and Procedural Fairness: Some Challenges to 
the Presumption of Innocence, 8 Crim. L. & Phil. 469, 470 (including the right against self-
incrimination and right to remain silent in a list of fundamental rules created to ensure fair trials). 
26.  See Stanton-Ife, supra note 17; Dennis, supra note 17.  
27.  Kimberly Ferzan, Preventive Justice and the Presumption of Innocence, 8 Crim. L. 
& Phil. 505 (2014); Ashworth & Zedner, Preventive Justice, supra note 13, at 72, 131. 
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as in the case of regulations on driving and other risky behavior, or justified by 
the individual’s commission of a crime. In either case, the imposition on the 
individual is justified only when the state has established that it is responding to 
some harm that will occur, definitively, without its intervention (or that has 
already occurred).28 
This focus on the harm principle—the notion that the state should not 
punish criminally unless some actual harm has been committed—respects and 
protects the dignity and autonomy of individuals, by taking seriously the notion 
that at any point an individual may change his or her mind regarding the 
commission of a crime.29 Moreover, as Mill noted, the notion of acting prior to 
the commission of a harm poses a greater risk of abuse than does a reactive 
criminal law, as almost any freedom or capability granted to an individual might 
make it more likely (by making it more possible) that the individual will use that 
freedom to commit a crime.30 
While preventive crimes, criminalizing risky behavior, have always 
existed, philosophers reason that criminalization does not threaten the harm 
principle in the cases of individuals whose actions impair their ability to make the 
decision to forego criminal behavior, and in the case of behavior that poses risks 
even outside of the actor’s intent.31 As an example, carrying a loaded gun might 
pose risks beyond an actor’s choice to shoot someone—merely dropping the gun 
can harm someone, and can happen in spite of the actor’s specific intent to avoid 
harming anyone.32 In such circumstances, criminalization of preventive behavior 
does not threaten personal autonomy, since the ability of the individual to choose 
                                                                                                                       
28.  Peter Ramsay, Imprisonment Under the Precautionary Principle, in Seeking 
Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 193, 193 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian 
Dennis eds., 2012). 
29.  G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis, Seeking Security: An Introduction, in Seeking Security: 
Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 1, 1–2 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012) 
(explaining that liberal democracies place individual autonomy at a premium and this results in 
the notion that criminal punishment should follow, rather than precede, harm); Larry Alexander 
& Kimberly Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate Crimes: Retribution or Prevention?, in Seeking Security: 
Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 103, 107 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 
2012) (arguing that moral culpability exists only when an actor unleashes inalterable harm, but 
that harm may be inalterable before a trigger is pulled). 
30.  John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 95 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859)  
The preventive function of government . . . is far more liable to be abused 
. . . than the punitory function; for there is hardly any part of the legitimate 
freedom of action of a human being that would not admit of being 
represented . . . as increasing the facilities of some form . . . of delinquency. 
31.  Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 29; Jeremy Horder, Prophylactic Crimes, in 
Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 79, 95–100 (G.R. Sullivan 
and Ian Dennis eds., 2012) (suggesting that criminalization does not threaten the harm principle 
when mere mistake might cause harm, because avoidance of mistakes is not controllable). 
32.  Horder, supra note 31. 
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to forego behavior that would cause the harm is already determined. In other 
words, one might choose not to shoot a gun, but if one carries a gun and drops it, 
one may still cause harm—and one cannot merely choose not to drop the gun, 
because mistakes are inevitable.33 Therefore, the harm is still known, definite, and 
unavoidable by the individual who is to be punished. 
The reliance on actual harm having been committed, or becoming 
inevitable, is not solely based on philosophical notions of liberty and autonomy. 
It is also a pragmatic protection of the innocent. Sociologists discussing the 
preventive state argue that its focus on risk-based, managerial practices 
inexcusably imposes on the innocent (and the underprivileged). Feeley and Simon 
discuss the creation of an underclass, overpoliced and underrepresented, whose 
liberty is regularly imposed upon in the interests of preventing criminal 
behavior.34 Bernard Harcourt35 and Stuart Scheingold36 warn of the manner in 
which this process imposes upon already marginalized members of society, 
ignoring questions of guilt and innocence in the effort to manage supposedly 
dangerous classes (whose guilt at the general level is presumed, negating the value 
of proving guilt on an individual level). 
The presumption of innocence is a final hurdle in the state’s 
responsibility to prove that it is acting only as a response to an actual and existing 
harm that is directly connected to the individual upon whose liberty it plans to 
impose. Traditional criminal justice is based on knowledge, proof, and individual 
responsibility.37 In other words, traditional criminal justice is based on guilt. 
In contrast, preventive criminal justice is based on risk.38 Risk is 
evaluated based on group characteristics, generalized notions of levels and 
characteristics of crime shared by that group, and actuarial predictions of how 
those criminal activities may be prevented.39 As Peter Ramsay describes, in 
                                                                                                                       
33.  Id. 
34.  Feeley & Simon, supra note 13, at 467. 
35.  Harcourt, supra note 13. 
36.  Stuart Scheingold, Constructing the New Political Criminology: Power, Authority, 
and the Post-Liberal State, 23 Law & Soc. Inq. 857, 868 (1998). 
37.  See id. at 868–69 (“[T]he criminal process ordinarily ought to be invoked by those 
charged with the responsibility for doing so, only when it appears that a crime has been 
committed and when there is a reasonable prospect of apprehending and convicting its 
perpetrator.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
38.  See Beck, supra note 13 (describing “the risk society”); Hughes, supra note 13 
(outlining the trend towards risk and crime prevention in late modern criminal justice); Slobogin, 
supra note 13, at 1–2  (discussing the influence of risk and dangerousness in criminal legal 
jurisprudence); Ericson, supra note 13 (describing the influence of risk on criminal justice); 
Zedner, supra note 13, at 174 (describing the development of criminal justice as increasingly 
risk averse); Harcourt, supra note 13 (describing the use of profiling to manage high risk 
populations). 
39.  Scheingold, supra note 36, at 867–88 (discussing the combination of disciplinary 
capabilities to monitor, evaluate, and surveil populations believed to have criminal propensities); 
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shifting from reactive to preventive criminal justice, the conversation shifts from 
one of known harm to one of unquantifiable danger.40 Traditional, reactive 
criminal justice processes have the opportunity to evaluate precisely what amount 
of harm was done, and to whom, because the harm has been done (or was at a 
point where its completion was not just wholly perceived but unavoidable). In 
contrast, preventive measures act on some analysis of possibilities. Even if we 
accept that those possibilities may be inevitable realities of large groups (based 
on statistical knowledge of communities), the harm posed by the specific 
individual upon whom the state is imposing is completely unknown. Vast 
percentages of the population imposed upon may never engage in criminal 
behavior, or may only engage in minor deviance, but the criminal process is used 
in their cases as well-based on the idea that the community will commit some 
amount of harm, as a whole, over time.41 
Rather than justifying state intervention on the known actions or known 
risk posed by an individual, state intervention is justified based on an unknown 
and unknowable danger to future possible victims.42 Direct connection between 
the individual imposed upon by the state and the harm the state is trying to prevent 
is therefore no longer necessary. 
This is in stark contrast to a philosophy that justifies state intervention 
only based on the moral fault of the individual whose liberty is being curtailed, or 
the harms known to be caused by certain proscribed activities. Rather than asking 
whether actions by offenders justify state intervention, the moral consideration in 
a system of preventive justice ignores the offender’s contribution, focusing 
instead on the level of harm that might occur if the state does not act. 
Indeed, at this point the determination of whether or not imposition on 
the individual is justified has very little to do with the risk posed by that individual. 
This may be seen in police rhetoric defending the practices of stop and frisk. 
Police departments attempting to justify the practice routinely rely on the risk 
posed by some gun carrying offender. For instance, Ray Kelly, former Police 
Commissioner in New York City, defended stop and frisk by stating that: 
Since 2002, the New York Police Department has taken tens of 
thousands of weapons off the street through proactive policing 
strategies. The effect this has had on the murder rate is 
staggering. . . . That’s 7,383 lives saved—and if history is a 
guide, they are largely the lives of young men of color. . . . To 
critics, none of this seems to much matter. Sidestepping the fact 
that these policies work, they continue to allege that massive 
                                                                                                                       
Harcourt, supra note 7 (discussing generalizations and impositions on groups of individuals due 
to the use of actuarial methods to evaluate risk). 
40.  Ramsay, supra note 28, at 201, 209–14. 
41.  See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. 
42.  Id. 
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numbers of minorities are stopped and questioned by police for 
no reason other than their race.43  
Asked specifically about how he might respond to a resentful, innocent civilian 
who is continually stopped in his neighborhood, Kelly responded that he was 
interested in saving that boy’s life.44 Similarly, former New York City Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg stated shortly before Kelly’s interview: 
Critics say the fact that we’re ‘only’ finding 800 guns a year 
through stops of people who fit a description or are engaged in 
suspicious activity means that we should end stop and frisk. 
Wrong. That’s the reason we need it—to deter people from 
carrying guns. We are the first preventers.45 
Those eight hundred guns constituted only 0.1% of stops per year.46 But the rarity 
of finding guns is irrelevant. The relatively few times that guns are found, as well 
as the deterrent effect of the stops themselves, are believed to justify the practice 
in its entirety, because the safety gained over time by those few successes is so 
large.  
Bloomberg’s comments, as well as Kelly’s, show that the state is well 
aware that most people frisked by police are completely innocent of the actions 
that truly concern police. But their guilt or innocence is irrelevant. Instead, the 
conversation concerns the amount of harm that might occur if frisks were 
abandoned.47 Rather than justifying the imposition on individuals based on their 
individual risks, the state justifies an overarching practice (ignoring the harm to 
individuals) based on the overarching harm that might occur if the practice ceased. 
                                                                                                                       
43.  Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Dubious Math Behind Stop and Frisk, The Atlantic (July 24, 
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/the-dubious-math-behind-stop-
and-frisk/278065/ (quoting Ray Kelly, former Police Commissioner in New York City). 
44.  Nightline, NYPD’s Stop-And-Frisk: Racial Profiling or Proactive Policing?, ABC 
News (May 1, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/nypds-controversial-stop-frisk-policy-racial-
profiling-proactive/story?id=19084229. 
45.  Id. 
46.  According to a 2013 New York Attorney General’s investigation. Office of Att’y 
Gen., New York, A Report on Arrests Arising From The New York City Police Department’s 
Stop-And-Frisk Practices (2013), available at 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAG_REPORT_ON_SQF_PRACTICES_NOV_2013.pdf. In 
1999, the Attorney General of New York released a report showing that guns had been found in 
only 2.5% of stops between 1998 and 1999. Office of Att’y Gen., New York, The New York 
City Police Department’s “Stop & Frisk” Practices 94 (Dec. 1, 1999) [hereinafter OAG Report], 
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop_frisk/stop_frisk.htm. 
47.  This argument has perhaps gained steam since stop and frisk has declined, coinciding 
with an increase in gun violence, in New York. See, e.g., Barry Paddock et al., After Bloody 
Weekend of 16 Shootings and 19 Wounded, Cops Arrest Only 2 as Number of City Shooting 
Victims Spikes, Daily News (July 9, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-
crime/bloody-weekend-19-injured-bullets-cops-arrest-2-article-1.1846552. 
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Some of the most popularized, and blatant, calls for preventive justice 
have come as part of calls for supposedly “exceptional” preventive measures in 
the context of counterterrorism,48 and so it is useful to examine an example in that 
context (although, as this article suggests, far fewer of those measures are as 
“exceptional” as either critics or proponents of the practices claim). One such 
example is the practice of preventively detaining terror (and other) defendants in 
solitary confinement when they are believed to pose a risk of harm from jail. This 
practice is often cited as an illustration of the extreme changes in criminal justice 
brought about as a response to, and most often in the cases of, defendants accused 
of terrorism.49 While early judicial rulings on the practice suggested that it could 
be justified only when the individuals so held had shown their own personal 
likelihood to cause a high level of harm from their jail cell (while awaiting trial, 
as yet unconvicted of any criminal offence),50 by 2001, judicial decisions clearly 
suggested that defendants could be held in solitary confinement if the government 
showed merely that they had the capability to cause serious harm.51 Evidence of 
                                                                                                                       
48.  Viet Dinh et al., Life After 9/11: Issues Affecting the Courts and the Nation, Panel 
Discussion at University of Kansas Law School, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 219 (2003) (describing the 
need for a strategy of “preventative prosecution”); Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y 
Gen, Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of the Components of the Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 8, 2001), 
available at http:www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/11/ag-memo-110801.html (asserting that the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 revealed need for a new, preventative criminal justice). 
49.  Heena Musabji & Christina Abraham, The Threat to Civil Liberties and Its Effect on 
Muslims in America, 1 DePaul J. Soc. Just. 83 (2007); Susan Akram & Maritza Karmel, 
Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and 
Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction without a Difference?, 38 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 609 (2005); Sadiq Reza, Unpatriotic Acts: An Introduction, 48 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 3 
(2004); Sam A. Schmidt & Joshua Dratel, Turning the Tables: Using the Government’s Secrecy 
and Security Arsenal for the Benefit of the Client in Terrorism Prosecutions, 48 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 69 (2004); Joshua Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and 
Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 81 (2003); 
J. Soffiyah Elijah, The Reality of Political Prisoners in the United States: What Sept. 11 Taught 
Us About Defending Them, 18 Harv. Blackletter L.J. 129 (2002). 
50.  United States v. Gotti, 755 F. Supp. 1159, 1164–65 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (upholding 
challenge of pretrial solitary confinement due to the lack of adequate evidence that the defendant 
intended to engage in violent criminal behavior even while incarcerated); United States v. 
Suleiman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4647, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (upholding similar challenge as 
in Gotti, despite defendant’s fingerprints on bomb manuals, allegations that he had terrorist 
training, and that he had been associated with a member of the first World Trade Center bombing 
conspiracy). 
51.  United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 82 (2d Cir. 2000) (justifying continued 
solitary confinement based solely on defendant’s capability to cause harm, with no discussion 
of the likelihood that he intended to, or was likely to cause harm while incarcerated). See 
generally Francesca Laguardia, Special Administrative Measures: An Example of Counterterror 
Excesses and Their Roots in U.S. Criminal Justice, 51 Crim. L. Bull. 157 (forthcoming 2015) 
(describing the transformation of SAMs practice from carefully overseen to reflexive and based 
on mere possibility of harm). 
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actual likelihood to do so was completely unnecessary.52 Individual risk 
assessments were, apparently, unnecessary. The fact that the defendants could 
cause serious harm suggested a sufficient basis to severely restrict their liberty, 
imposing the harshest form of confinement available in the criminal justice 
system, years before a determination of guilt was made.53 Moreover, the level of 
imposition on the defendant steadily retreated from discussions of the propriety 
of his confinement.54 The practice became routine. As one prosecutor noted, when 
questioned, “everyone charged with a material support type crime is housed in the 
same way”: pretrial solitary confinement.55 Once the defendant is indicted for a 
certain type of crime, no further analysis of risk is necessary. 
Since terrorism has captured the United States’ attention, and responses 
to terrorism have as well, preventive tactics such as pretrial detention and solitary 
confinement have been criticized roundly as deviant exceptions to accepted legal 
and moral norms.56 Yet, like the use of pretrial solitary confinement, many 
fundamental aspects of the preventive turn have taken place independent of this 
context, and prior to 2001. Indeed, discussion of the preventive turn was well 
underway in 1998, referencing developments in immigration law, detention of 
juveniles, the use of loitering laws in efforts to curb drug and gang-related crimes, 
and, of course, the use of stop and frisk.57 The roots of this preventive turn, then, 
seem to be in our criminal justice culture, rather than a reaction to the exceptional 
nature of the threat of terrorism. 
                                                                                                                       
52.  Such evidence was provided in cases such as United States v. Nosair, 1994 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12159, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), to argue that Nosair had been involved in the first 
World Trade Center bombing conspiracy, and in United States v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101, 104 (2d 
Cir. 1998), to demonstrate that Felipe had directed murders from prison. The lack of such 
evidence resulted in release in United States v. Gotti and United States v. Suleiman, but no 
mention of such evidence was necessary to continue the detention of the defendant in United 
States v. El-Hage. 
53.  See supra note 51 and accompanying text. El-Hage was held for over fifteen months, 
while later defendants were held for years at a time prior to trial. El-Hage, 213 F.3d at 78; see 
After 3 Years in Pretrial Solitary Confinement, Fahad Hashmi Pleads Guilty on Eve of Terror 
Trial, Democracy Now! (Apr. 28, 2010), 
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/28/after_3_years_in_pretrial_solitary (discussing 
Hashmi’s pre-trial detention in solitary confinement for over three years); Defendant’s Renewed 
Motion for Conditional Release from the Longest Pretrial Imprisonment in United States History 
at 1, United States v. Warsame, 651 F. Supp. 2d 978 (D. Minn. 2009) (Crim. No. 04-29) (on file 
with author) (describing Warsame’s four and a half year detention in SAMs as the longest 
pretrial detention in U.S. history). 
54.  Laguardia, supra note 51. 
55.  Transcript of Proceeding at 43, United States v. Sadequee, No.  
1:06–CR–147–WSD, 2009 WL 3785566 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 10, 2009) (on file with author). 
56.  Mayer, supra note 2; Sands, supra note 2; Cole, supra note 2; Cole & Dempsey, 
supra note 5; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
57.  See generally Steiker, supra note 13 (describing the turn toward preventive justice 
and scholars’ failure to acknowledge the developments up to that point). 
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If I am right, and our preventive anti-terror practices have more to do 
with criminal justice culture than with terrorism, we should be able to find 
precursors of most of these “responses” in conventional criminal justice practices 
and discourses. Early research on the use of pretrial solitary confinement suggests 
that this is indeed the case,58 and several other scholars have noted places where 
supposedly unique responses to terrorism may actually predate the panic of the 
early twenty-first century.59 But can more extreme deviations from accepted U.S. 
norms really be attributed to a  
pre-2001 preventive revolution? 
To begin an analysis of this question, there may be no better example 
than the U.S. government’s use, and justification, of torture. With only a few 
exceptions the words of David Cole can well summarize the starting point for 
most scholars studying the use of torture since 9/11: “International and U.S. law 
provide that torture is never justifiable . . . .”60 In the eyes of these scholars, the 
fact that the United States tortured therefore signals a major break from the past, 
showing that in the state of exception no past law can hold back the abusive state. 
The fact that the United States not only employed torture, but that legal elites 
offered legal approval for its use, shows that the rule of law, constitutional, and 
human rights protections were always mere “parchment barriers”61 against 
excessive state action. Of course, for the rule of law to provide an effective barrier, 
that rule would have to be clearly opposed to the use of torture. As this article will 
show, that opposition was not nearly as clear as critics like Cole would like to 
believe. 
Along with being a striking example of the United States’ supposed 
deviation from its own prior norms (as well as its actual deviation from accepted 
international norms) since 2001, torture provides an excellent example of the new 
preventive logic of criminal justice. This suggests that, rather than sudden 
deviance, torture may fit well within the preventive paradigm already well 
underway in U.S. criminal justice. 
                                                                                                                       
58.  Laguardia, supra note 51 (discussing the evolution of pretrial solitary confinement 
from its original applications against drug and organized crime defendants to a practice seen as 
primarily used against suspected terrorists). 
59.  Mary L. Dudziak, September 11 in History: A Watershed Moment? (2003); John 
Hagan, Twin Towers, Iron Cages and the Culture of Control, in Managing Modernity: Politics 
and the Culture of Control (M. Matravers ed., 2005); see also supra notes 6 (discussing the 
development of material support statutes, the use of immigration violations to preventively 
incapacitate suspected terrorists, and the use of informants in such investigations), 7 (discussing 
the development of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and its relationship to coercive 
interrogation), and accompanying text. 
60.  David Cole, The Torture Memos 7 (2009). 
61.  The Federalist No. 48, at 305 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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B. Torture as Preventive Tactic 
From the description of the preventive paradigm presented above, the 
theoretical placement of torture in this paradigm should not be a difficult jump. 
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to discuss the logical connection between the 
preventive paradigm and the use of torture in the War on Terror. 
At least since 2001, the primary justification offered for the use of torture 
has been the ticking time-bomb hypothetical.62 In this hypothetical situation, 
interrogators are faced with the dilemma of knowing of an imminent terrorist 
attack that threatens multiple lives (a time bomb somewhere in a city); knowing 
that they have an individual in custody who has information that can prevent the 
attack; and knowing that the individual will only provide that information if he is 
tortured. 
This hypothetical device is meant to place the spotlight directly on the 
conflicting interests in U.S. jurisprudence regarding torture: on the one hand, there 
is the interest of the public in obtaining vital information in order to prevent future 
deaths; and on the other, there is the interest of the suspect in avoiding unbearable 
pain. 
But the ticking time-bomb situation, as so often described, completely 
avoids the question of law enforcement’s accuracy in evaluating the situation.63 
Commonly, the hypothetical stipulates that law enforcement officers know for a 
                                                                                                                       
62.  John Ip, Two Narratives of Torture, 7 Nw. UJ Int’l Hum. Rts. 35 (2009); Luban, 
supra note 1; David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1425, 
1440 (2005); Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in the “War on Terrorism,” 1 J. Nat’l. Sec. L. & 
Pol’y 285 (2005). As these scholars describe, the narrative has strong public pull. In 2011, 
General David Petraeus, soon-to-be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, suggested that 
extraordinary interrogation might be called for in situations where lives were at stake, such as 
“to disarm a nuclear device set to explode under the Empire State Building.” Senator John 
McCain (R-Arizona) quickly agreed, referring to a “ticking time bomb scenario.” Ken Dilanian, 
Gen. David H. Petraeus Suggests Interrogation Policy for Emergencies, L.A. Times, June 23, 
2011, http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2011/jun/23/nation/la-na-petraeus-20110624. The agreement of the two was particularly notable 
given that both are known to be opposed to the use of torture. This suggests that even those 
lawmakers who are against torture in a general sense know there is a large political toll to 
ignoring the ticking time bomb scenario. Similarly, as a presidential hopeful, future President 
Barack Obama (as well as each of his competitors for the Democratic nomination) had to answer 
the question of whether torture could be justified when “[w]e know there’s a big bomb going off 
in America in three days and we know this guy knows where it is.” Obama responded that 
America could not have a policy sanctioning torture, but he was careful to preface that statement 
with the promise that “I will do whatever it takes to keep America safe. And there are going to 
be all sorts of hypotheticals and emergency situations and I will make that judgment at that 
time.” The Democratic Presidential Debate on MSNBC, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/26/us/politics/26DEBATETRANSCRIPT.html?pagewanted
=all. 
63.  Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, supra note 62, at 1442–45. 
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fact that they have a guilty individual, implicated in a severe crime, who has 
knowledge of how to stop this crime from occurring. But how do law enforcement 
officers know that the individual they are holding has the information necessary 
to find and/or defuse the bomb? How do they even know that a bomb exists? 
By ignoring these questions, the suspect’s possible innocence—and 
therefore, the possibility that the suspect cannot possibly deserve to be tortured—
is rendered irrelevant. The hypothetical erases innocence from consideration, 
masking the interests of the suspect rather than focusing on them and dismissing 
the fact that the person tortured is merely a suspect. His guilt and his knowledge 
have been evaluated only by law enforcement officers. As history continues to 
prove, law enforcement officers can be wrong even in such high stakes 
scenarios.64 
Accepting the hypothetical as representative of the interests at stake 
necessarily erases the question of the torture victim’s innocence from the 
conversation. It frames the debate so as to necessitate our acceptance of law 
enforcement determinations, placing no checks on those determinations, and 
removing from consideration even the possibility that law enforcement may be 
incorrect. The philosopher engaging with this hypothetical and finding that torture 
is justified is doing so based on one of two assumptions: either that torture is 
justified because he has accepted, without any checks or proof, that law 
enforcement is correct; or torture is justified because he does not care whether law 
enforcement is correct. In either case, the possibility of preventing harm has 
overcome the need for law enforcement officers to prove their suspicions before 
being allowed to infringe on the suspects’ wellbeing. The focus of the debate is 
instead on the possibility of rescuing future victims. The interests of the person 
upon whose liberty the state will impose65 have been erased from the calculus. 
Readers may respond with the possibility that there is a high probability 
that law enforcement is correct. This response highlights precisely the problem 
caused by the hypothetical. The hypothetical is not framed in language suggesting 
a high probability. Instead, it jumps straight to knowledge. Knowledge is 
presumed, which cuts off the ability to question how high a probability of 
correctness might be required before torture is appropriate, or what proof might 
be required in order to determine that the probability is high enough. By beginning 
the hypothetical with “law enforcement knows,” the thinker necessarily jumps 
past these questions—at the same time hurdling past considerations of possibly 
innocent suspects, now victims of (entirely good faith) law enforcement 
                                                                                                                       
64.  See, e.g., Scott Shane, Amid Details on Torture, Data on 26 Who Were Held in Error, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
12/13/us/politics/amid-details-on-torture-data-on-26-held-in-error-.html?_r=0 (discussing 
detainees held and tortured, but described by the CIA’s own documents as having been 
“mistakenly detained”). 
65.  And this is a euphemistic way to describe torture. 
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assumptions. The purpose of the hypothetical is to skip these considerations, 
thereby erasing them from public debate. For purposes of illustration, the 
following sections highlight the considerations the time hypothetical so 
conveniently ignores. 
1. The Issues the Ticking Time Bomb Erases: There Exists a Bomb 
Consider the case of the suspect who has boasted of leaving a bomb 
somewhere in the city. We may be tempted to accept that here, surely, police 
“know” that the bomb exists. Yet individuals have lied about placing bombs in 
the past, either due to mental deficiency or efforts to threaten. By the time the 
torture has begun, it will be difficult to convince law enforcement that the original 
claim was a lie. 
The recent release of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s 
Report on the CIA’s use of torture exposes the possibility that law enforcement 
may overestimate its knowledge of an imminent threat. The CIA’s enhanced 
interrogation program has been repeatedly justified with reference to law 
enforcement’s confidence that the United States was in danger of a nuclear attack 
by al-Qaeda in the spring of 2002.66 Yet the only threat with a semblance of 
nuclear capability that has been exposed to the public in the past twelve years is 
that of José Padilla, whose nuclear aspirations consisted of creating a dirty bomb 
by putting uranium in a bucket and “swinging it around [his] head as fast as 
possible for 45 minutes.”67 This was the plot that Jay Bybee specifically pointed 
to in order to highlight the nuclear threat that was believed to exist at the time the 
OLC torture memos were written.68 The foolishness of this plan was universally 
agreed upon, by both law enforcement and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (the 
mastermind of the September 11th attacks), who tasked Padilla with attacking 
                                                                                                                       
66.  See Interview by Lesley Stahl with Jose Rodriguez, former Dir. of the CIA’s Nat’l 
Clandestine Serv., 60 Minutes: Hard Measures: Ex-CIA Head Defends Post 9/11 Tactics (Apr. 
29, 2012), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
hard-measures-ex-cia-head-defends-post-9-11-tactics/3/; see also Jay Bybee, Classified 
Response To The U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility Classified Report 
Dated July 29, 2009, 14–15 (July 29, 2009), available at 
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/opr-bybeefinal.pdf (describing the belief of the intelligence 
community that hundreds of American lives would be lost if interrogations did not continue); 
Senate Report, supra note 4, at 225–31 (describing the repeated use of discovery of the “Dirty 
Bomb Plot” to justify enhanced interrogation based on the threat of nuclear attack). 
67.  Senate Report, supra note 4, at 226. 
68.  Id. at 227. 
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high-rise buildings in Chicago using natural gas explosions instead.69 Indeed, the 
CIA determined that this second plot was also “infeasible as envisioned.”70  
But consider a case where an officer has seen a bomb, evaluated it, and 
determined that it requires a code to be disabled, or a specific wire cut. Even here, 
the fact that the bomb will explode is assumed, and ignores the fact that 
bombmaking is in fact rather difficult. Exemplifying this fact is the case of the 
failed Times Square bombing in May 2010.71 Faisal Shahzad left a car full of 
explosives set to ignite in Times Square, but the bomb failed to go off (Shahzad 
had deviated from his originally planned explosive device because he was afraid 
of detection, and his improvisation failed completely).72 Alternately, there is the 
case of “shoe bomber” Richard Reid, whose attempt to ignite a bomb on an 
airplane failed, apparently after the fuse to the bomb became wet from weather 
and Reid’s own sweat.73 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted a bomb similar 
to Reid’s, but hidden in his underwear. That bomb would have exploded 
(according to TSA officials), if not for the fact that Abdulmutallab wore the same 
underwear for weeks prior to the bombing attempt, “degrad[ing]” the device to 
the point where it could no longer detonate.74 
This raises a second misconstruction in the assumption that there exists 
a threat of severe harm if no action is taken. The hypothetical assumes that the 
police “know” of a bomb in a city that will explode. As mentioned above, there is 
no explanation as to how they know this. There is no discussion of the likelihood 
that it is true, or that it is false. That “many” lives will be lost is assumed and 
seemingly relied upon for the legitimacy of the hypothetical.75 There is no 
                                                                                                                       
69.  Id. at 225–26 nn.1301–06; see id. at 229 n.1312 (stating that it “took [the CIA] until 
2007 to consistently stop referring to [Padilla’s] ‘Dirty Bomb’ plot—a plan [the CIA] concluded 
early on was never operationally viable”); see also id. at 88 (demonstrating that the persistent 
belief in the nuclear threat was apparently the result of poor signals intelligence). 
70.  Id. at 231. 
71.  Lorraine Adams & Ayesha Nasir, Inside the Mind of the Times Square Bomber, The 
Guardian, Sept. 18, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2010/sep/19/times-square-bomber. 
72.  Devlin Barrett, Shahzad Used Poor Bomb Materials to Avoid Detection, Wall Street 
Journal, July 21, 2010, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB20001424052748704723604575379371725895584. According to another police source, 
Shahzad had set the bomb to explode at 7 AM rather than 7 PM. Adams & Nasir, supra note 71. 
73.  Ian Sample, Cargo Plane Bomb Plot: What Is PETN?, The Guardian, Nov. 1, 2010, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/01/cargo-bomb-plot-petn-explosive. 
74.  Nicole Hensley, Underwear Bomb Aboard 2009 Flight Failed Because it was Sullied 
by Suicide Bomber, N.Y. Daily News, July 25, 2014, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/underwear-bomb-aboard-2009-flight-failed-
soiled-article-1.1880193. 
75.  This in spite of the fact that one of the most successful attacks in this country, the 
Boston Marathon Bombing, claimed the lives of only three people. See Katharine Seelye, 
Marathon Bombings Trial Will Remain in Boston, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2014, 
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consideration of how many lives are necessary to justify torture. A bomb in a city 
is supposedly sufficient. Is the same true of a bomb in a town? A village? A bomb 
tied to a person stranded alone in a desert?76 
2. The Issues the Ticking Time Bomb Erases: The Suspect’s 
Knowledge 
Another possible mistake lies in the assumption that the suspect has 
information worthy of torture. Independent of the moral standing of the suspect is 
the question of whether the information he has can truly prevent deaths. The 
question of how sure police are that this suspect can stop the bomb, or that they 
can stop the bomb with information that they can coerce from him,77 is similarly 
ignored in this hypothetical situation. Again, the Report of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence suggests that the CIA overestimated its knowledge in 
this regard several times. Abu Zubaydah, for instance, was tortured largely due to 
CIA beliefs that he could provide information about “the next attack in the U.S.”78 
The CIA later determined that Abu Zubaydah never had this information.79 
Another example is that of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who was tortured under 
the assumption that he knew of “the next attacks planned for the U.S.” and “[w]ho 
and where [operatives were] inside the U.S.”80 This assumption contradicted the 
analysis of the detention site’s interrogators, who believed bin al-Shibh was 
cooperative and was providing all the information he had.81 After three more 
weeks of enhanced interrogation,82 for a total of thirty-four days of torture, the 
CIA acknowledged it had been wrong regarding the level of information he 
possessed.83 
Similarly, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was subjected to enhanced 
interrogation based on the CIA’s beliefs that he had information about imminent 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/us/trial-of-marathon-bombing-suspect-to-remain-in-
boston-judge-rules.html. 
76.  While I personally cannot see the logic in enumerating how many lives could justify 
the use of torture—surely if it is worthwhile to save many lives, it would be worthwhile to save 
just one—the assumption of the hypothetical is one of saving many lives, presumably bolstering 
the strength of the case through notions of relative sacrifice and utilitarianism while 
deemphasizing or entirely avoiding considerations of accuracy. 
77.  A fourth possible fallacy, of course, exists in the assumption that torture is likely to 
work better than traditional interrogations. 
78.  Senate Report, supra note 4, at 31. 
79.  Id. at 31. 
80.  Id. at 78. 
81.  Id. at 78. 
82.  Id. at 79. 
83.  See id. at 75 (noting that the CIA “concluded that bin al-Shibh was not a senior 
member of al-Qa’ida and was not in a position to know details about al-Qa’ida’s plans for future 
attacks”). 
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plots and al-Qaeda operatives.84 In fact, high-ranking members of the CIA 
maintained this belief, determining that it was “inconceivable” that he did not 
have the information, despite the repeated analyses of interrogators to the 
contrary.85 Nearly two years after this assessment was given for the last time, CIA 
contractors determined that al-Nashiri never had the information that the CIA 
sought.86 
Arsala Khan was detained and tortured for a month before CIA 
interrogators determined that he “[did] not appear to be the subject involved in . . 
. current plans or activities against U.S. personnel or facilities . . . .”87 He was then 
held in military custody for four years before the CIA determined that the source 
that reported to the CIA regarding Kahn’s involvement with bin Laden had a 
vendetta against his family.88 
Indeed, even when an officer has seen an individual set the bomb himself 
(should this ever happen, and it certainly almost never does), it is impossible to 
know if the bomb can be stopped. As such, the hypothetical circumstance most 
favorable to proponents of enhanced interrogation techniques still does not 
guarantee that the detainee has valuable information to obtain through torture. 
3. The Issues the Ticking Time Bomb Erases: Torture Will Work 
The hypothetical is further flawed in assuming that police will be able to 
obtain information through torture, or will know how to evaluate the truth and 
falsity of any statements they do obtain. Here, once again, recent revelations are 
telling. The declassified executive summary of the Senate Select Intelligence 
Committee’s report on the use of torture by the CIA mentions, as we might expect, 
that detainees lied in an effort to stop the torture. One footnote in the report tells 
of a detainee who repeatedly contradicted himself, in a single session, apparently 
in desperation.89 Connections between a Jemaah Islamiya cell and al-Qaeda were 
                                                                                                                       
84.  Id. at 65–67. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. at 73 (“21 months after the final documented use of the CIA’s enhanced 
interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, an assessment by CIA contract interrogator 
DUNBAR and another CIA interrogator concluded that  
al-Nashiri provided ‘essentially no actionable information,’ and that ‘the probability that he has 
much more to contribute is low.’”). 
87.  Id. at 110. 
88.  Id. 
89. The Committee Report states: 
Samr al-Barq, told CIA interrogators that ‘we never made anthrax.’ . . . 
[He] was told that the harsh treatment would not stop until he ‘told the 
truth.’ According to cables, crying, al-Barq then said ‘I made the anthrax.’ 
Asked if he was lying, al-Barq said that he was. After CIA interrogators 
‘demonstrated the penalty for lying,’ al-Barq again stated that ‘I made the 
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similarly fabricated by a detainee being tortured.90 As discussed above, 
interrogators spent weeks torturing detainees under the mistaken belief that the 
detainees had more information than they were giving, unable to determine when 
detainees were telling the truth.91 
But more strikingly, the report also states that at least two individuals 
were detained after Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, in response to being 
waterboarded, falsely stated that they were linked to al-Qaeda.92 Indeed, Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed apparently withstood even waterboarding, regularly (and 
convincingly) misleading interrogators.93 
In fact, much of the U.S. invasion of Iraq may be linked back to the 
torture of one detainee, rendered to Egypt as part of the U.S. program of 
extraordinary rendition, whose statements that there were connections between 
al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein were used to justify the U.S. invasion.94 The 
detainee later stated that he had fabricated the connections in order to satisfy his 
interrogators.95 
4. How These Assumptions Highlight Torture’s Preventive Focus 
and Flaws 
The persistent defense, and the staying power of the ticking time bomb 
hypothetical, boils down to “yes, but what if we know?” The response is, in a 
preventive regime, we cannot know. It is impossible to know that the bomb will 
explode, because bombs can be duds. It is impossible to know if we have the right 
person, and what information he or she has, because suspects lie, witnesses lie, 
and law enforcement gets things wrong. This is the forward-looking nature of 
preventive tactics—because they are based on future events occurring, they are 
unknowable. 
The natural response is that the facts may be close enough to the truth, 
i.e. “but what if we know enough?” This response only serves to show the success 
of the hypothetical in framing the debate to rely on an undetermined, unquantified, 
                                                                                                                       
anthrax’ and then immediately recanted, and then again stated that he made 
anthrax.  
Id. at 82–83 n.442. 
90.  See id. at 108–09 (“Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the 
CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques”). 
91.  See supra notes 77–87 and associated text. 
92.  Shane, supra note 64; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 83, 108 n.448. 
93.  Senate Report, supra note 4, at 94–96. 
94.  William Maclean, Libya Reports Prison Suicide of Top Qaeda Man, Reuters (May 
11, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/05/11/us-libya-prisoner-death-
idUSTRE54A4WU20090511. 
95.  S. Rep. No. 109-331, at 81 (2006) (describing al Libi’s torture, including beatings 
and placement in a box that was 50 cm by 50 cm, and his fabrication of the story in response to 
that torture). 
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and unquestioned balance of likelihoods and possible harms while pretending to 
speak of certainty.  The hypothetical cleverly avoids the questions of how much 
is enough, how will be prove that much is known, and who will we trust to come 
to those conclusions (questions which, our current criminal justice system 
suggests, rely on processes that could not be completed quickly enough to respond 
to a true ticking time bomb situation).   
Similarly, critics point to these assumptions—that the “suspect” is at 
least to some extent “guilty” (based on his terrorist knowledge), and/or that there 
exists a large harm that can be prevented through his interrogation—as flaws in 
the hypothetical,96 but in fact they reveal the workings of the precautionary 
principle at its core. The harm posed by the ticking time-bomb need not be 
quantified, “many” lives will be lost, and no further thought is necessary as to 
how many lives are required in order to justify the conscious imposition of 
extreme pain. We need not further examine whether law enforcement is accurate 
in its belief that the bomb even exists, because the chance of the bomb poses a 
large enough threat to justify intervention whether or not that intervention is in 
fact necessary. The harm here is both uncertain and unquantifiable, but the fact 
that it may be great offers justification for an extreme response. 
In these ways, the ticking time-bomb hypothetical is the distilled essence 
of the precautionary principle, and the preventive state. The flaws in the 
hypothetical are precisely the assumptions that lead to preventive policies—the 
hypothetical ignores innocence, it ignores the importance of certainty regarding 
the situation and the possible harm threatened, and it manages to expunge 
considerations of those individuals who may be affected by state policies by 
redirecting focus solely to the (possible but uncertain) future victims of this 
unquantified, uncertain harm. Here is where the philosophical transformation of 
priorities occurs, in Garland’s words, from “protection from the state to protection 
by the state.”97 
As was noted above, this evolution in priorities appears to have begun 
long before 2001, and as the use of torture and the ticking time-bomb justification 
for that use so aptly summarize this shift in priorities, we might well expect to see 
signs of that transformation in the acceptance of this logic prior to 2001. In fact, 
as the following sections discuss, we do. These predecessors of the logic of torture 
show that this logic was not an exceptional response to the threat of terrorism, or 
to the panic caused by that threat. Rather than the threat of terrorism posing a risk 
                                                                                                                       
96.  Ip, supra, note 62; Luban, supra note 1; Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking 
Bomb, supra note 62; Scheppele, supra note 62; G.R. Sullivan, The Hard Treatment of Innocent 
Persons in State Responses to the Threat of Large Scale, and Imminent Terrorist Violence: 
Examining the Legal Constraints, in Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of 
Criminal Harms 293 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012). 
97.  David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary 
Society 12 (2001). 
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to our conventional criminal justice priorities by offering a slope for the nation to 
slide down, it was the threat of kidnappers and rapists that created the slick slide 
on which counterterror interrogators found themselves. 
III. EARLY EVIDENCE OF THE LOGIC OF TORTURE 
In testing whether or not the defense of torture was truly “unthinkable” 
prior to 2001, it is worthwhile to look at the logic and justifications offered by 
those who authorized and instigated the use of torture by U.S. forces. For these 
purposes, the legal memos written by lawyers evaluating the program, relied upon 
by the CIA to provide legal support for their activities, are particularly useful. 
These memos offer insight into the way legal elites believed they could justify 
torture. 
A. Necessity, Self Defense, and Public Safety 
In his first, infamous “torture memo,” John Yoo authorized the use of 
torture based on the notion of necessity and self-defense, a justification that was 
first floated by CIA officers and lawyers for the CIA as early as November 2001,98 
and was repeated by later torture memo authors.99 Yoo argued that the 
government’s interest in defending itself and its people can justify the use of 
torture.100 According to Yoo, the likelihood of a damaging terror attack made 
torturing a terror detainee the lesser of two evils, and therefore justifiable.101 CIA 
attorneys similarly referred to the possibility of using the necessity defense when 
torture could save “many,” even “thousands of lives.”102 In testimony before 
Congress in November of 2001, Deputy Director of Operations for the CIA James 
Pavitt specifically referred to the possibility of using torture in a situation where 
“there is a nuclear weapon somewhere in the United States that is going to be 
detonated tomorrow, and I’ve got the guy who I know built it and hid it.”103 
This justification was implicitly repeated in 2005, while it was carefully 
and painstakingly avoided in official memos in the years in between.104 Yet even 
                                                                                                                       
98.  Senate Report, supra note 4, at 31, 179. 
99.  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340.2340A, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Yoo I Memo], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Senate Report, supra note 4, at 179–80. 
103.  Id. at 437 n.2447. 
104.  Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, CIA, Re: Application of the War 
Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to 
Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al-Qaeda 
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while the OLC seemed to be distancing itself from the logic of necessity as a 
justification for torture, in August 2004, another detainee was tortured based on 
precisely that reasoning.105 Even as late as July 2007, the CIA’s program was 
being justified in legal memoranda as necessary in order to obtain lifesaving 
information regarding “imminent” bomb threats.106 
In making these claims, Yoo, the OLC, and CIA attorneys, invoked the 
shadow of the ticking time-bomb scenario. U.S. lawyers were not alone in making 
this defense, nor did it arise purely in the wake of the 2001 attacks. Instead, the 
argument had already appeared in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. 
Israel,107 which was cited by CIA attorneys,108 and by 2000, the question of 
whether state use of torture could be justified in a ticking time bomb situation had 
made its way into U.S. criminal law textbooks.109 By 2004, the textbook was used 
                                                                                                                       
Detainees 3–4 (May 30, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-
warcrimesact.pdf (concluding that the CIA’s interrogation program does not shock the 
conscience because the interests at stake are so large). 
 In 2004, after the Yoo Memos became public, the Department of Justice acted to distance 
itself from Yoo’s reasoning, including his analysis of the definition of “specific intent,” his 
claims of the reach of executive authority, and his understanding of the protections that might 
be offered by the necessity defense. However, rather than disagreeing with the reasoning, the 
Justice Department wrote new memos relying on factual claims of the level of pain caused by 
various techniques—the reasoning itself remained unchallenged, if momentarily set aside, until 
it was reborn in 2005 via direct reference to criminal procedure, Fifth Amendment limitations, 
and the importance of government interests. See Christopher Kutz, Torture, Necessity and 
Existential Politics, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 235, 248–49 (2007) (noting that “the Levin memo 
specifically does not address the Bybee memo's analysis of the micro-necessity criminal 
defenses, nor does it take up the Bybee memo’s claim that legislation may not constrain the 
President from acting on military necessity during times of war” and discussing the ways the 
necessity doctrine continued to be used by the Bush Administration in the case of torture and 
counterterror policies more generally); Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340.2340A, at 1–2 (Dec. 30, 2004), available 
at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/dojtorture123004mem.pdf (calling the 
discussion of defenses “unnecessary”). 
105.  See Senate Report, supra note 4, at 416–17. 
106.  Id. at 434. These threats included, again, Jose Padilla’s “Dirty Bomb Plot” and the 
similarly derided plot to dismantle the Brooklyn Bridge using “machine tools.” See id. at 434–
35, 435 n.2438 (“[T]he former chief of CTC’s Bin Ladin Unit described [the plot against the 
Brooklyn Bridge] as ‘half-baked,’ and ‘more of a nuisnance [sic] than a threat.’”); see also id. 
at 283 n.1605 (“[He] wrote: ‘again, odd. ksm wants to get ‘machine tools’ to loosen the bolts on 
bridges so they collapse? did he think no one would see or hear these yahoos trying to unscrew 
the bridge?’”). 
107.  See HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Isr. [1999] (Isr.). 
108.  See Senate Report, supra note 4, at 19 n.51. 
109.  See Sanford Kadish & Stephen Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes (6th ed. 
2000). It is worth noting that Jennifer Koester, Yoo’s co-author of the memos, who the Office 
of Professional Responsibility claimed bore “initial responsibility for a number of significant 
errors of scholarship and judgment” would have been in law school in 2000. Office of Prof’l 
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in Criminal Law classes, including at New York University, Georgia State 
University, George Mason University, Hofstra University, Pace Law School, 
Harvard, and the University of Chicago.110 By 2001, the discussion had made its 
way into at least one criminal law class at an elite institution, and another by 2004 
(prior to the revelations regarding the United States’ use of torture).111 
But this pure question of necessity was not the only inroad into the 
acceptance of physical brutality as a part of interrogation in the face of an 
immediate threat. Instead, the ticking time bomb scenario had appeared numerous 
times already, in response to the criminal procedure requirement that suspects be 
advised of their right to an attorney prior to custodial interrogation. It is worth 
briefly retelling the history of this doctrine in order to contextualize it. 
The Miranda doctrine112 arose as a response to the types of coercive 
interrogation in which law enforcement routinely engaged leading up to the mid-
1960s, when the case was decided. Prior efforts to stem the tide of brutal police 
interrogation practices led to a  
hodge-podge of rules given on a case-by-case basis and limited to the case at hand. 
Police moved through a variety of tactics, and the Supreme Court’s analysis was 
specific to the facts of each individual case, so that a decision that police could 
not hold a defendant, naked, for hours, meant nothing to a decision as to whether 
police could “threaten to bring in his ailing wife” or threaten to take away a 
defendant’s children if she refused to cooperate with the interrogation.113 Police 
                                                                                                                       
Responsibility, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s 
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced 
Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists, 188 (drft. Dec. 22, 2008) (on file with 
author). Although most likely she would have completed her criminal law class prior to 2000, 
she may have heard of the case and argument in other classes. 
110.  See Harry Subrin, Criminal Law Syllabus, New York University (2004) (on file 
with author); Georgia State University Criminal Law Syllabus (2002), available at 
http://laws.gsu.edu/wedmundson/Syllabi/CRIM02.SYL.htm; George Mason Initial Class 
Assignments (2003), available at 
http://www.law.gmu.edu/academics/assignments/2003/2003spring; Hofstra University School 
of Law First Year Book List (2003), available at 
http://www.hofstra.edu/pdf/law_1styearbooklist_f2003_812.pdf; John Humback, Criminal Law 
Analysis and Writing, Pace University (2002), available at 
http://lawweb.pace.edu/jhumbach/ASSGNMT-1st.htm; Carol Steiker, Criminal Law Outline, 
Harvard Law School (on file with author); Stephen Schulhofer, Criminal Law Outline, 
University of Chicago (on file with author); Jacqueline McMurtrie, Criminal Law Outline, 
University of Washington School of Law (2004), available at 
http://faculty.washington.edu/jackiem/Criminal_Law_2004/ 
Syllabus.htm. 
111.  See Criminal Law Outline, University of Chicago, supra note 110; Criminal Law 
Outline, New York University, supra note 110. 
112.  So called because it was first iterated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
113.  See Jerome Skolnick, American Interrogation: From Torture to Trickery, in 
Torture: A Collection 105, 113–14 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); see also Charles D. 
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continued to employ the “third degree” through the 1960s, which could include 
such interrogation methods as beatings, extended interrogations,114 and the sweat 
box (in which suspects were placed in incredibly small rooms containing stoves 
so they would suffer from extreme heat conditions until coerced into 
“confessing”).115 Finally, rather than continuing to rule individual methods 
unconstitutionally coercive, the Supreme Court ruled that suspects must be 
advised of their right to counsel.116 This created a bright-line rule that limited 
police conduct far more than a prohibition on brutality by avoiding the constant 
argument as to what level of abuse was sufficient to constitute “brutality.” In 
contrast to prior decisions on interrogations, Miranda seems to have successfully 
limited police use of force in interrogations,117 but it was subject to immediate 
public backlash.118 
Public and scholarly critique of the Miranda requirements often took the 
same form, that of the “kidnapping hypothetical,” a variant and precursor of the 
ticking time bomb.119 In this hypothetical situation a child is kidnapped, the 
perpetrator (but not the child) is found, and has already suggested that the victim’s 
life is in danger, but questioning of the perpetrator must wait for a lawyer to be 
made available to the suspect.120 The hypothetical was later reiterated in response 
to Miranda, and quickly developed to include an imminent threat to the victim's 
life.121 
                                                                                                                       
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 109, 115 (1998) (listing similar cases 
exemplifying the difficulties created by the lack of a bright line rule on voluntariness). 
114.  While the Supreme Court determined in 1944 that thirty-six hours was too long to 
interrogate a suspect under constitutional requirements, recent research shows that police often 
continue to interrogate suspects for as long as twenty-four hours. See Steven Drizin & Richard 
Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 891, 894 
(2003). 
115.  See Skolnick, supra note 113, at 112. 
116.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79. 
117.  Skolnick, supra note 113; Drizin & Leo, supra note 114. 
118.  Carol Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2466, 2466 (1996). 
119.  See Allen Rostron. The Law and Order Theme in Political and Popular Culture, 
37 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 323 (2012) (discussing Dirty Harry as representative of the broader 
public backlash to Miranda). The kidnapping hypothetical seems to have first appeared in 
response to an earlier right to counsel case, which is typically considered a Miranda precursor. 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
120.  Henry Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L. 
Rev. 929, 949 (1965). 
121.  Henry Friendly, Benchmarks 277 (University of Chicago Press, 1st ed. 1967). See 
William Pizzi, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in a Rescue Situation, 76 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 567, 568–69 (1985) (referencing Friendly’s articulation of the kidnapping 
hypothetical). 
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The hypothetical achieved more public attention when it was popularized 
in the movie Dirty Harry in 1971.122 There, the situation was more extreme. Rather 
than simply being kidnapped, the victim, a 14-year-old girl, was buried alive and 
drawing her last breath at any moment. Dirty Harry, the hero cop who refused to 
play by the rules, found the perpetrator, shot him in the leg, held his gun to the 
perpetrator’s head, and threatened to kill him if he did not reveal the girl’s 
location. The perpetrator, of course, requested a lawyer. Dirty Harry proceeded to 
step on the perpetrator’s wounded leg, applying pressure until the perpetrator, 
screaming in agony, finally gave up the requested information. Police rushed to 
the location, but it was too late—the girl was dead.123 
The thirty years preceding the 2001 attacks show increasing acceptance 
in criminal law of the framework and reasoning of the kidnapping or ticking time 
bomb hypothetical as a way to evaluate when torture might be used in order to 
facilitate interrogation. In 1974, the California Court of Appeals ruled that 
statements obtained prior to the provision of an attorney would be admissible in 
court when they had been obtained as part of an emergency situation where the 
primary interest of questioning police officers was to save a life.124 This case 
reaffirmed a previous case, People v. Modesto,125 which responded to Escobedo, 
the case from which the kidnapping hypothetical originates, and made a similar 
ruling that had come into question after the Miranda decision. 
Eight years later, the Florida Court of Appeals came to a more extreme, 
if connected, determination. In Leon v. State,126 several officers had attacked a 
kidnapping suspect. In the words of the appellate court, “[t]hey threatened and 
physically abused him by twisting his arm behind his back and choking him until 
he revealed where [the victim] was being held.”127 The record does not suggest 
the officers had any reason to believe there was an imminent threat to the victim’s 
life (other than the fact that kidnapping is often followed by the murder of the 
victim). Yet the ruling opinion held that the defendant’s later confession to 
unrelated police officers was not affected by the earlier coercion, in large part 
because the coercion had been applied solely in order to save the victim’s life, and 
not to obtain a confession.128 The case was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, 
which similarly noted that “[t]his was . . . a group of concerned officers acting in 
                                                                                                                       
122.  Dirty Harry (Warner Bros 1971). 
123.  Id. See Michael Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1457 (1997) (describing the movie and its relation to criminal procedure). 
124.  People v. Dean, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555, 561–62 (Cal. App. 1974). 
125.  42 Cal. Rptr. 417 (Cal. App. 1965). 
126.  410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. App. 1982). 
127.  Id. at 202. 
128.  Id. at 203. 
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a reasonable manner to obtain information they needed in order to protect another 
individual from bodily harm or death.”129 
By this time, the Escobedo situation had already come to life in New 
York, and in 1984 an appellate ruling came down in the case resulting from those 
facts. Like Leon v. State, People v. Krom,130 dealt with a kidnapping. However, 
unlike Leon, the victim was not held in an apartment while ransom was arranged. 
Instead, she was buried alive in a wooded area, and by the time the defendant led 
police to her whereabouts, she was dead.131 
Interestingly, there is no hint in the appellate case that the police officers 
that interrogated Krom knew that his victim was in such dire circumstances until 
she was located. Krom demanded money and immunity in exchange for revealing 
the victim’s whereabouts, and he eventually won promises from the government 
and the victim’s father complying with those demands.132 He claimed that he had 
made efforts to prevent the victim from suffocation by shooting holes in the lid of 
the box in which she was buried.133 The credibility of this statement is not 
commented upon in the record, but this claim of an intention not to kill the victim 
and the lack of information in the record as to the police officers’ knowledge of 
the victim’s imminent death both suggest that the defendant had not threatened 
his interrogators with her death and that the interrogators did not consider this 
possibility.134 
But the court’s ruling makes clear that whether police knew how serious 
the situation actually was is irrelevant in a kidnapping case. In justifying the 
admission of Krom’s statements into evidence, the court created an emergency 
exception to its procedural requirements (one already existing in New York’s 
Fourth Amendment doctrine in kidnapping situations), stating that when “police 
are engaged in their primary duty of attempting to provide assistance to a person 
whose life is, or may be, in danger,” such an exception would be appropriate.135 
The court’s discussion of a preexisting Fourth Amendment exception to the 
warrant requirement similarly makes clear that a life-threatening emergency 
                                                                                                                       
129.  Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770, 773 (11th Cir. 1984). 
130.  61 N.Y.2d 187, 192–93 (1984). 
131.  Id. at 195. 
132.  Id. at 194. 
133.  Id. at 195. 
134.  The possible procedural violation in Krom was not a Miranda violation per se. 
Instead it involved New York’s even higher standards, requiring that all interrogation or efforts 
to convince a defendant to waive his right to an attorney cease once a defendant has invoked his 
right. In Krom’s case, police merely continued to question him (and attempted to bargain with 
him) in order to get him to cooperate. Id. at 197–98. 
135.  Id. at 198 (emphasis added). 
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situation is presumed to exist in a kidnapping case, and that in such circumstances, 
exceptions to procedure are acceptable.136 
While these isolated cases bore similarities to one another, the 
nationwide discussion began in earnest with the decision of New York v. 
Quarles.137 In that case, a police officer entered a store and demanded to know 
where a suspected rapist had hidden his gun. An exception to the Miranda 
doctrine was created, allowing the use of this statement at trial, based on the idea 
that the gun may have been on the premises and that some bystander might have 
happened upon the gun, thereby putting him and the surrounding public in 
jeopardy.138 One dissent noted emphatically that there would be no question that 
a police officer could question a suspect without offering Miranda warnings in 
the case of a bomb about to explode.139 As the following section makes clear, this 
case brought to the rest of the country the “public safety,” “emergency,” or 
“rescue” exception to the Miranda requirements and in a manner that went beyond 
the allowance of mere questioning. 
B. Beyond Doctrine: The Entrance of the Ticking Time Bomb in the 
Socialization of Legal Elites 
These concerns slowly entered elite legal culture, as evidenced by their 
inclusion in basic criminal procedure textbooks. Here, concerns were included in 
discussions of what might be referred to as a “public safety exception,”140 a 
“rescue doctrine,”141 or, notably, an “emergency exception”142 to Miranda’s 
bright line rule. 
In order to analyze the acceptance of emergency exceptions to the right 
against abusive interrogation, I looked to the evolution of criminal procedure 
textbooks from 1970 through 2005. After a preliminary examination of fifteen 
textbook series (those series I could find that had existed prior to 1980 and 
                                                                                                                       
136.  Id. at 198–99 (“In Fourth Amendment cases this court and others have recognized 
an emergency exception which permits the police to enter premises, without a warrant or 
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, in order to search for a person who 
is missing and may be in danger.” (emphasis added)). 
137.  467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
138.  Id. at 655–56. In fact, this danger was almost nonexistent because the environment 
was completely controlled, the store was empty, it was the middle of the night, and there was 
sufficient police presence to easily surround and cut off all access to the store. Id. at 676 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
139.  Id. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that while the questioning should be 
legal, admission of the statements as evidence should not). 
140.  Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases, Comments, and Questions 
532 (9th ed. 1999). 
141.  Id. at 538. 
142.  Stephen Saltzburg & Daniel Capra, American Criminal Procedure 519 (3d ed. 
1988). 
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continued through 2002), I limited my analysis to those textbooks used most 
heavily in 2003, in order to ensure that I covered the most well-accepted doctrine 
of the time (as represented by its presence in established law schools).143 These 
series are listed as Appendix A. In order to evaluate how this law evolved over 
several decades, I obtained editions of the textbooks, to the extent that they 
existed, dating back to the Miranda decision.144 
To analyze the evolving acceptance of exceptions to the prohibition on 
coercive interrogation I performed content analysis and word counts, to represent 
the extent of discussion on the issue.145 My content analysis focused on narratives 
and themes used by the authors to describe the evolving public safety exception. 
I looked to the phrases used to describe the exception (in some cases “emergency,” 
in others, “public safety” or “rescue”), which offer a clue as to the purposes these 
authors believed were determined to be (and students in the process of legal 
socialization absorbed as being) legally sufficient to negate Miranda and other 
protections against coercive interrogation. 
I further looked for signs that the authors were attempting to 
problematize the doctrine, by offering counterlogic, oppositional cases or 
naturally (logically) following doctrine that seemed unreasonable.146 I evaluated 
whether authors offered additional supportive or unsupportive legal reasoning, 
such as dissenting opinions, supportive case law, and supportive or unsupportive 
legal scholarship. 
I rely particularly heavily on Kamisar et al.’s Modern Criminal 
Procedure: Cases, Comments, Questions, which seems to hold an established 
position as the dominant criminal procedure textbook in the United States.147 Most 
                                                                                                                       
143.  See Stephanos Bibas, The Real-World Shift in Criminal Procedure, 93 J. Crim. L. 
& Criminology 789, 792–93 (2003) (providing data on how many law schools use each of the 
major criminal law textbooks). 
144.  I also collected several textbook series based on the fact that they had lasted from 
the 1970s through 2001, but as I could not get reliable statistics on their usage in law schools, I 
omitted them from my final analysis. 
145.  For prior use of this technique, see generally Joachim Savelsberg & Peter King, 
American Memories: Atrocities and the Law (2011) (performing word counts in history 
textbooks as part of an analysis of the dominance of trial narratives in American understanding 
of the Mai Lai massacre). 
146.  Examples of such problematization were surprisingly absent. One textbook series 
did offer a discussion of Quarles prior to a discussion on due process protections and, after a 
few pages, suggested that threats of physical violence might present “a per se factor” of 
involuntariness. See Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure: 
Cases and Commentary 625, 629–30 (6th ed. 2000). 
147.  Douglas Kahn, Yale Kamisar: A Principled Man For All Seasons, 102 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1722 (2004); Daniel Yeager, Searches, Seizures, Confessions, and Some Thoughts on 
"Criminal Procedure: Regulation of Police Investigation—Legal, Historical, Empirical, and 
Comparative Materials, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1043 (1996); Bibas, supra note 143. Yale Kamisar 
et al. have written one of the twenty most cited legal texts, according to a 2005 analysis of texts 
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importantly, Kamisar et al.’s text was well established both before and after 2001, 
giving insight into the way the emergency exception entered the legal discussion, 
rather than its mere existence in the moment. 
These textbooks represent not only the opinions of influential and 
prestigious members of the legal academy, but they form the basis of 
understanding for students entering the legal field. Unlike specific precedent, 
which may be debated, textbook discussions are presented as fact. Any argument 
that appears in a textbook acquires at least some credibility, as there is an 
assumption that, if it were entirely incredible, it would be omitted from discussion. 
While questions and hypotheticals may offer some room for critical analysis, the 
cases presented directly after those questions become baseline legal authority for 
young law students, establishing a foundation of legal thought and a broad outline 
of the contours of the legal discussion on the matter. 
Any legal decision may be considered supportive of the notion that the 
ideas in the opinion are, at least, within the realms of legal possibility (that those 
ideas passed at least one laugh test). But cases cited in legal textbooks obtain this 
authority for students before they have formed any other conception of the law of 
the land. Therefore, these cases become a starting point for young lawyers, upon 
which any following legal research rests and against which it may be compared.148 
To be sure, this methodology has its limitations. First, it is always 
possible for a student to reject the statements of the textbook entirely. Second, we 
cannot be sure how much each individual professor stressed these aspects of 
criminal procedure, entirely skipped over them, or even personally undermined 
the claims the textbooks were making. Finally, these textbooks are only a small 
sample of the dozens of criminal procedure textbooks on the market, and it is 
possible that even their most uniform aspects are chance occurrences that are not 
representative of the majority of criminal procedure classes. 
Still, at the very least these textbooks are a window into the education of 
thousands of young lawyers each year for over a decade, as well as the accepted 
wisdom of those experts who seem to be most trusted by other scholars in the 
field. At a minimum, the presence of the torture narrative in these textbooks 
suggests that it was far from unimaginable in legal thought preceding the terror 
attacks of 2001, and the uniformity of the narrative (described below) in the 
dominant texts of the time makes it highly unlikely that these textbooks were 
complete outliers. 
                                                                                                                       
and treatises written between 1978 and 1999. Fred R. Shapiro, Most Cited Law Books of All 
Time, Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, http://lib.law.washington.edu/ref/mostcited.html (last updated 
Jan. 14, 2005). 
148.  For an analysis of the way in which law school, and particularly the first year of 
law school, fundamentally changes the thinking and worldview of law students, see Elizabeth 
Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to Think Like a Lawyer (2007). 
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These popularly used textbooks, therefore, occupy a particularly 
powerful position in the creation and representation of the dominant legal culture. 
However, I also looked to citations of the relevant cases, in order to evaluate their 
staying power and reach among judges and in case law nationwide. 
Under this analysis it is apparent that Quarles quickly created a weakness 
in the prohibition on coercive interrogation. Following the decision, textbooks 
immediately began to include an excerpt of Quarles, possibly with half a page of 
notes on other cases and dilemmas presented by the need to protect the public.149 
Quarles was merely the most cited example of the cases appearing across 
the country,150 and as scholars began to discuss the issue,151 the lacuna of the 
public safety exception expanded. This, too, was reflected in criminal procedure 
textbooks. In Kamisar, et al., 1980–2005, the number of words used to describe 
issues related to the public safety exception (outside of the continued presence of 
the excerpt from New York v. Quarles) rose from zero, to 334 words in 1986, and 
to 549 words in 1999 and 2002 (See Table 1). In 2005 the space allotted to such 
questions quadrupled, clearly in response to questions of torture (although 
brutality had already received attention in previous years with reference to Leon 
v. State). 
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF WORDS USED TO DISCUSS PUBLIC SAFETY 
EXCEPTIONS TO MIRANDA IN EDITIONS OF KAMISAR ET AL.’S MODERN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS. 
1980 (Fifth Edition) 0 
1986 (Sixth Edition) 334 
1990 (Seventh Edition 419 
1994 (Eighth Edition) 419 
1999 (Ninth Edition) 549 
2002 (Tenth Edition) 549 
2005 (Eleventh Edition) 2000 
 
                                                                                                                       
149.  See Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases, Comments, Questions 
599 (6th ed. 1986); Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure: 
Cases and Commentary 519 (3rd ed. 1988). 
150.  See supra notes 124–137 and accompanying text; State v. Finch, 975 P.2d 967 
(Wash. 1999). 
151.  See, e.g., Pizzi, supra note 121 (discussing the rescue situation); Charles 
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 109 (1998) (discussing exceptions to the 
Miranda requirements). 
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Recall that, as Kamisar et al. state, in Leon v. State one judge held that 
“the use of police threats and physical violence at the scene of arrest in order to 
ascertain the kidnap victim’s whereabouts ‘did not constitutionally infect the later 
confessions.’”152 Recall that, in that case, officers had exceeded Miranda’s 
limitations not with questioning, but with physical abuse.153 Notably, the reason 
this activity was excused from due process protections was in large part because 
(as would later be suggested in the Yoo and Bybee memos) the intention of police 
officers was to save the victim’s life.154 
In textbooks, Leon appears to have been subsumed in Quarles, but Leon 
did carry some life of its own, as is seen in its citation record. By 2001 the case 
was cited in five cases (four in Florida and one in Alabama),155 seven scholarly 
articles,156 and Kamisar et al. (along with one other criminal procedure 
textbook).157 Between 2001 and 2010 the case was cited in three books158 and 
                                                                                                                       
152.  Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases, Comments, Questions 514 
(10th ed. 2002) (citing Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. App.1982)). 
153.  See Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d 201, 203–05 (Fla App. 1982). 
154.  Id. at 203–04. 
155.  See Watkins v. State, 497 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Andrade v. 
State, 564 So. 2d 238, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1990); Turner v. State, 423 So. 2d 594 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1982); Porter v. State, 410 So. 2d 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 
1982); Porter v. State, 410 So. 2d 164, 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1982) (Fergusen, J., 
dissenting). I have omitted discussion of whether the citations were positive or negative because 
it makes little difference to the question of whether the reasoning in Leon had impact and staying 
power in case law. As the question is largely one of the laugh test, and whether it was imaginable 
in criminal legal doctrine that circumstances could exist to excuse the use of physical coercion 
of suspects, I am more interested in the extent to which judges felt this reasoning was worthy of 
being addressed at all. 
156.  Paul Marcus, A Return to the “Bright Line Rule” of Miranda, 35 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 93, 101 n.41 (1993); Ada Clapp, The Second Circuit  
Review—1988–1989 Term: Criminal Procedure: The Second Circuit Adopts a Clarification 
Approach to Ambiguous Requests for Counsel: United States v. Gotay, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 511, 
534 n.131 (1990); Irene Rosenberg & Yale Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of 
Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 69, 97 n.176 (1989); Roger Machlis, Criminal 
Procedure II: The Privilege Against Self-incrimination, 1985 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 289 (1985); 
Donald Dripps, Supreme Court Review: Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—And the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 699, 721 n.89 (1988); Welsh 
S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 13 n.73 (1986); 
Martin Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule—A Critique, 35 
Hastings L.J. 429, 472 n.277 (1984). 
157.  Kamisar, supra note 152; James Haddad et al., Criminal Procedure: Cases and 
Comments (1987). 
158.  Discourses and Practices of Terrorism: Interrogating Terror  53, 188, 192, 195 (Bob 
Brecher et al. eds., 2010); Yuval Ginbar, Why Not Torture Terrorists?: Moral, Practical and 
Legal Aspects of the “Ticking Bomb” Justification for Torture 319 n.233, 320 n.236 (2008); 
James Acker et al., Criminal Procedure: A Contemporary Perspective 14–17, 99, 283, 300 
(2004). 
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seven scholarly articles,159 six discussing torture in the context of terrorism, as 
well as one more state case.160 Leon v. Wainwright,161 the federal resolution of the 
case, was cited in ten federal cases outside of the Eleventh Circuit,162 eight cases 
within the Eleventh Circuit (including four federal appellate decisions),163 six 
state court decisions,164 and four journal articles by 2001.165 After 2001 it was 
cited in another fourteen law journal articles (all but four explicitly refer to torture 
                                                                                                                       
159.  Kenneth Lasson, Torture, Truth Serum, and Ticking Bombs: Toward a Pragmatic 
Perspective on Coercive Interrogation, 39 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 329, 353 n.100 (2008); John Cohan, 
Torture and the Necessity Doctrine, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 1587, 1603 n.71 (2007); Paul Marcus, 
Seegers Lecture: It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions in 
Criminal Prosecutions, 40 Val. U. L. Rev. 601, 607 n.31 (2006); Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, 
The Torture Debate: Tortured Responses (A Reply to Our Critics): Physically Persuading 
Suspects Is Morally Preferable to Allowing the Innocent to Be Murdered, 40 U.S.F. L. Rev. 703, 
721 n.56 (2006); Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 201, 240–41 nn.138–42 (2003); 
Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Reply to Professor Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 275, 285 nn.48–49 (2003). 
160.  People v. Richardson, 917 N.E.2d 501, 517 (Ill. 2009). 
161.  734 F.2d 770 (11th Cir. 1984). 
162.  United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1467 (10th Cir. 1993); Streetman v. Lynaugh, 
812 F.2d 950, 957 (5th Cir. 1987); Vasquez v. Senkowski, 54 F. Supp. 2d 208, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999); United States v. Glover, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1649 (D. Kan. 1999); United States v. 
Stewart, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1146 (D. Kan. 1999); United States ex rel. Holland v. McGinnis, 
754 F. Supp. 1245, 1258 (N.D. Ill. 1990); United States ex rel. Holland v. McGinnis, No. 90 C 
04359, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15753 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1991); United States v. Rullo, 748 F. 
Supp. 36, 41 (D. Mass. 1990); United States ex rel. Wilson v. O’Leary, 709 F. Supp. 837, 840 
(N.D. Ill. 1989); United States ex rel. Wilson v. O’Leary, No. 87 C 6521, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14074 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 1988). 
163.  United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1475 (11th Cir. 1992); Harris v. 
Dugger, 874 F.2d 756, 761 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Arango, 853 F.2d 818, 824 (11th 
Cir. 1988); Smith v. Wainwright, 777 F.2d 609, 618 (11th Cir. 1985); Parker v. Turpin, 60 F. 
Supp. 2d 1332, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1999); United States v. Grimes, 911 F. Supp. 1485, 1498 (M.D. 
Fla. 1996); Ferrell v. Davis, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16137, at *11 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 10, 1991); 
Rutherford v. Davis, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16064, at *16 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 1990). 
164.  Johnson v. State, 696 So. 2d 326, 329 (Fla. 1997); State v. O’Hara, 627 A.2d 1001, 
1004 (Me. 1993); Maqueira v. State, 588 So. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. 1991); Halberg v. State, 903 P.2d 
1090, 1095 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); People v. Douglas, 788 P.2d 640, 655 (Cal. 1990); Lee v. 
State, 484 So. 2d 1180, 1184 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985). 
165.  Project: Sixteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme 
Court and Courts of Appeals 1985–1986: I. Investigation and Police Practices, 75 Geo. L.J. 
713, 836 n.879 (1987); Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the 
Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 733, 754 n.156 (1987); Project: 
Fifteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of 
Appeals 1984–1985, 74 Geo. L.J. 499, 607 n.800 (1986); Gregory K. Thoreson, Note, The 
Compelled Confession: A Case Against Admissibility, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 800, 807 n.54 
(1985). 
34 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [46.3:1 
or human rights in their titles),166 four state cases,167 three Eleventh  Circuit 
cases,168 two federal cases in other circuits,169 and one book.170 
In the courts, citations of Leon and of the Eleventh Circuit case that came 
out of it, generally ignore the question of the validity of use of force in Leon’s 
first interrogation. Instead, judges cite the case primarily to support the decision 
that police impropriety in early interrogations may be “cleaned” by the passage of 
time, new interrogators, or other factors, in order to avoid “tainting” later 
confessions.171 
                                                                                                                       
166.  Stephen Hoffman, Is Torture Justified in Terrorism Cases?: Comparing U.S. and 
European Views, 33 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 379, 388–89 nn.59–64 (2013); Gregory McNeal, A Cup 
of Coffee After the Waterboard: Seemingly Voluntary Post-Abuse Statements, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 
943, 961 n.123, 963  
nn.136–39 (2010); Symposium: Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Evidentiary Standards from 
Christian Theology to Guantanamo: Evidence Gained from Torture: Wishful Thinking, 
Checkability, and Extreme Circumstances, 17 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 281 (2009); Cohan, 
supra note 159; Lasson, supra note 159; Elizabeth Silker, Note, Terrorists, Interrogation, and 
Torture: Where Do We Draw the Line?, 31 J. Legis. 191, 209 nn.150–53 (2004); Jeffrey 
Addicott, Into the Star Chamber: Does the United States Engage in the Use of Torture or Similar 
Illegal Practices in the War on Terror?, 92 Ky. L.J. 849, 888 nn.268–76 (2004); The Committee 
on International Human Rights and The Committee on Military Affairs and Justice, Human 
Rights Standards Applicable to the United States’ Interrogation of Detainees, 59 The Record 
183, 207 n.59 (2004); Dershowitz, supra note 159; Strauss, supra note 159; Andrew Moher, 
Note and Comment, The Lesser of Two Evils?: An Argument For Judicially Sanctioned Torture 
in a Post-9/11 World, 26 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 469, 487 n.97 (2004); Welsh White, Confessions 
in Capital Cases, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 979, 988 n.51 (2003); Seth Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack 
and Screw: Constitutional Constraints in the War on Terror, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 278, 291 n.44 
(2003); Susan Burger, Book Review, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, 
Responding to the Challenge, 174 Mil. L. Rev. 189, 193 n.30 (2002). 
167.  Hall v. State, 107 So. 3d 262, 271 (Fla. 2012); Ellington v. State, 735 S.E.2d 736, 
747 (Ga. 2012); Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 880 (Fla. 2012) (Quince, J. dissenting); State 
v. Pulliam, 2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 545 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012). 
168.  United States v. Vickers, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127661 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 14, 2010); 
United States v. Morante-Palacios, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45275 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2010); 
United States v. Merrill, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11041 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010). 
169.  Carter v. Poole, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58674 (N.D.N.Y July 30, 2008); United 
States v. Lopez, 437 F.3d 1059, 1067 (10th Cir. 2006). 
170.  Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, 
Responding to the Challenge 124, 247 n.3, 253 (2002). 
171.  United States v. Lopez, 437 F.3d 1059, 1067 (10th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing the 
circumstances of that case from those in Leon); United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1467–68 
(10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Leon’s statements concerning when a second confession will be 
admissible when an earlier confession is not); United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 
1475 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Leon to support the argument that a defendant’s second confession 
will only be suppressed if it is tainted by the unconstitutional coercion used in an earlier 
interrogation); Smith v. Wainwright, 777 F.2d 609, 618 (11th Cir. 1985); Carter v. Poole, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58674, at *46 (N.D.N.Y July 30, 2008) (enumerating factors to consider in 
determining whether a confession has been tainted by earlier coercion); Vasquez v. Senkowski, 
54 F. Supp. 2d 208, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Leon and Perdue on the issue of when a 
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In contrast, Kamisar et al.’s reference to Leon and the acceptance of 
police abuse in life-saving circumstances is not just citation, but suggestion. “Are 
there (should there be) any limits on what a police officer may do to a suspected 
kidnapper in order to get him to reveal the location of a kidnap victim?” the 
textbook asks.172 It answers by referring to Leon, stating that the “use of police 
threats and physical violence at the scene of arrest in order to ascertain the kidnap 
victim’s whereabouts ‘did not constitutionally infect the later confessions.’”173 
While the first edition’s discussion of Quarles included a counterexample, 
suggesting that there may be limits on the interrogation of a suspect already 
represented by counsel, later editions dropped this case in favor of a reference to 
Pizzi’s 1985 article, which restates the kidnapping hypothetical and suggests, 
again, that physical abuse might well be appropriate in such circumstances.174 
                                                                                                                       
second confession can be considered voluntary); United States v. Glover, No. 98-10059-01-
JWL, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1649, at *34–35 (D. Kan. Jan. 29, 1999) (quoting Perdue and Leon 
on the issue of when a second confession is admissible); United States ex rel. Wilson v. O’Leary, 
709 F.Supp. 837, 840 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (citing Leon for the statement that courts of appeals look 
at whether the second confession was sufficiently attenuated from the earlier confession); United 
States ex rel. Wilson v. O’Leary, No. 87 C 6521, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14074, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 7, 1988) (citing Leon in determining that a second confession was admissible where the 
circumstances were sufficiently different from the earlier interrogation); Watkins v. State, 497 
So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (citing Leon in support of the decision to suppress 
one of the defendant’s inculpatory statements but to admit a later statement); Lee v. State, 484 
So. 2d 1180, 1184 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (citing Leon and other cases in enumerating the 
significant factors in determining whether a later statement is admissible); People v. Douglas, 
788 P.2d 640, 655 (Cal. 1990) (citing Leon in determining that the circumstances of the second 
confession were sufficiently distinct); State v. Pulliam, I.D. No. 1112006547A, 2012 Del. Super. 
LEXIS 545, at *26 n.65 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012) (citing Leon and other cases in 
enumerating the factors to consider in deciding whether a second confession is valid); Braddy 
v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 880 (Fla. 2012) (Quince, J. dissenting) (distinguishing the case from 
Leon and arguing that the defendant’s second confession was not admissible); Andrade v. State, 
564 So. 2d 238, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1990) (citing Leon and other cases supporting 
the determination that the defendant’s incriminating statements were unrelated to earlier 
physical and verbal abuse by different police officers); Ellington v. State, 735 S.E.2d 736, 747 
(Ga. 2012) (quoting Leon’s statement that a second confession is admissible if there has been a 
“sufficiently isolating break in the stream of events”); People v. Richardson, 917 N.E.2d 501, 
517 (Ill. 2009) (citing Leon to support the proposition that a confession is not inadmissible when 
it is sufficiently distinct from earlier coercion); State v. O’Hara, 627 A.2d 1001, 1004 (Me. 1993) 
(citing Leon in stating that a witness’s prior involuntary statement does not preclude admission 
of a later voluntary statement). 
172.  Kamisar, supra note 149, at 539. 
173.  Id. 
174.  Id.; Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases, Comments, Questions 
505 (7th ed. 1990) (citing People v. Knapp, 441 N.E.2d 1057 (N.Y. 1982)); Kamisar, supra note 
140, at 539 (“‘There are due process  
limits . . . even where life is at stake’ but ‘[i]n determining those limits [the] traditional scope of 
police conduct permitted . . . is only a starting point.’”). Note that even the limitation on abuse 
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This article was cited again in another line of textbooks, apparently instead of 
reference to Leon and Krom.175 Indeed, no textbook responded to this question 
with case law or scholarship contradicting Leon, Krom, or Quarles. Where the 
question was asked, it was uniformly answered in the affirmative.176 
The Quarles reasoning (and particularly the dissent, referring to the 
threat of bombs, which was included in three of the five most commonly used 
textbooks, including both of the two most commonly used books177) offers a clear 
hole in the prohibition on coercive interrogation, suggesting that in extreme cases 
any level of abuse may be acceptable. The notion that even extreme abuse may be 
acceptable in extreme circumstances gained force as it was specifically 
highlighted by textbooks, and as textbooks offered further support for the 
suggestion in the form of at least one court and one legal scholar.178 
Where the textbooks recognize limits to the amount of abuse authorized 
by Quarles, they do so by referring back to the older limits of voluntariness and 
due process limitations.179 Yet this creates circular reasoning, eventually leading 
back to the allowance of brutality, because these limitations (themselves quite 
weak, as discussed below) are influenced as well by the kidnapping/ticking time 
bomb reasoning of Quarles. 
C. Shocking the Conscience, Specific Intent, and Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment 
One of John Yoo’s most shocking claims, and perhaps most ridiculous 
as well, is that brutal treatment cannot be torture if motivated by a desire to apply 
only enough pain to get information, rather than a specifically sadistic desire to 
                                                                                                                       
is given in the context of due process violations, an analysis which returns to the question of the 
size of the government interest at stake. For further discussion, see infra Part III(c). 
175.  Welsh White & James Tomkovicz, Criminal Procedure: Constitutional Constraints 
upon Investigation and Proof 538 (4th ed. 2001); Welsh White & James Tomkovicz, Criminal 
Procedure: Constitutional Constraints upon Investigation and Proof 488 (3d ed. 1998); Welsh 
White & James Tomkovicz, Criminal Procedure: Constitutional Constraints upon Investigation 
and Proof 561 (2d ed. 1994); Welsh White & James Tomkovicz, Criminal Procedure: 
Constitutional Constraints upon Investigation and Proof 507 (1st ed. 1990). 
176.  One series of textbooks did not broach the question directly, but did follow its 
discussion of Quarles with a reiteration of due process and voluntariness requirements, and the 
suggestion that threats of physical violence might breach these limits. Saltzburg & Capra, supra 
note 142, at 497. 
177.  Kamisar, supra note 140; Ronald Allen et al., Comprehensive Criminal Procedure 
836 (2001); White & Tomkovicz (3d ed. 1998), supra note 175, at 487–88. 
178.  Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770 (11th Cir. 1984); Pizzi, supra note 121. 
179.  See, e.g., Saltzburg & Capra, supra note 146 (“[T]he confession itself can be 
admitted if obtained under emergency circumstances . . . . However . . . the due process 
involuntariness test retains vitality today.” (internal citations omitted)). In Allen et al.’s 
casebook, the Quarles case is included within a section on “voluntariness reconsidered.” Allen, 
supra note 177, at 828–37. 
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apply a torturous level of pain to a victim.180 The notion is belied by the fact that 
torture in the context of interrogation is specifically enumerated as one of the 
types of torture banned under the Convention Against Torture (CAT),181 and 
torture in order to force a confession is specifically envisioned by the Torture 
Victim Protection Act of 1991 (passed by Congress in order to enact CAT).182 
Yet Daniel Levin echoes this logic, when he states that severe pain and 
suffering should be “the conscious desire” of the torturer.183 Bradbury states the 
same.184 The two agree that individuals who act in good faith believe “that [their] 
conduct would not be expected to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering . . . would not have the specific intent necessary to violate [the federal 
statute prohibiting torture].”185 
                                                                                                                       
180.  Yoo I Memo, supra note 99, at 4. 
[E]ven if the defendant knows that severe pain will result from his actions, 
if causing such harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite specific 
intent . . . [A] defendant is guilty of torture only if he acts with the express 
purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering on a person.  
It was so well accepted that this was a claim that applying only enough pressure to get vital 
information from the victim would not be torture, that the claim was specifically discredited in 
Daniel Levin’s December 2004 memorandum. Memorandum from Levin, supra note 104, at 17 
(“[A] defendant’s motive (to protect national security, for example) is not relevant to the 
question whether he has acted with the requisite specific intent under the statute.”). Still, Levin 
held to the notion that a torturous level of pain must be the “conscious desire” of the defendant, 
undermining his disavowal of Yoo’s logic. Id. at 16–17; see also infra note 183 and 
accompanying text. 
181.  The Convention Against Torture defines torture as “any act by which severe pain 
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes 
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession.” Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85, available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html. 
182.  Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) 
(codified as note following 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2014)). The Act included a definition of torture 
adopting the language of the Convention Against Torture, so that torture includes, “any act . . . 
by which severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally inflicted on [an] individual for such 
purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a confession.” 28 
U.S.C. §1350 note 3(b)(1) (1992). 
183.  Memorandum from Levin, supra note 104, at 16. 
184.  Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, CIA, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value 
al Qaeda Detainee 27 (May 10, 2005), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2013/10/21/memo-bradbury2005-3.pdf 
(discussing the meaning of “specifically intended”) [hereinafter Memorandum from Steven 
Bradbury, May 10, 2005]. 
185.  Memorandum from Daniel Levin, supra note 104, at 17; see Memorandum from 
Steven Bradbury, May 10, 2005, supra note 184, at 28 (“[I]f an individual acted in good faith, 
and only after reasonable investigation establishing that his conduct would not be expected to 
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It is true that, between the torturer who acts believing he will not cause 
a torturous level of pain, and the torturer who acts with the conscious desire to 
cause that pain with no higher motive driving him, there is the “knowing” torturer 
who, possibly reluctantly, engages in behavior he knows will cause torturous 
levels of pain, but only for some higher purpose. Post-Yoo memo authors, through 
avoidance of legal analysis, carefully protect the status of this individual. The 
situation is expressly avoided in the Levin memo, which discusses contradicting 
legal analyses regarding knowledge of harm as related to specific intent, and 
concludes that it would not be “useful to try to define the precise meaning of 
‘specific intent’ in [the torture statute].”186 Bradbury’s May 10, 2005 memo 
echoes Levin’s analysis, as well as his refusal to draw a conclusion regarding such 
defendants.187 
In 2005, it became clear that the Department of Justice’s reasoning was 
that torture must be sadistic; it must be cruel. Bradbury’s May 30, 2005 memo 
expands the prior analyses of motive, while arguing that the CIA techniques could 
not be considered cruel, inhuman, and degrading (a standard generally considered 
to be less abusive than torture). Here, Bradbury relies on the criminal legal 
doctrine requiring that behavior “shock the conscience” in order to qualify as cruel 
and unusual.188 This is also the outer boundary of violations of due process—a 
due process violation is found to have occurred only when the behavior of police 
officers “shock the conscience.”189 
Like Yoo, Bradbury notes that the United States specifically limited its 
adherence under CAT to behavior that falls under domestic legal standards of 
cruel and unusual punishment.190 Like Yoo, Bradbury finds that these legal 
standards set an incredibly high bar—specifically one of arbitrariness—where 
punishment is cruel for cruelty’s sake, rather than for any legitimate governmental 
purpose, such as obtaining direly needed information.191 
The reiteration of this logic suggests that it was not as  
far-fetched as critics suggest.192 As other scholars have noted, by 2005 the “shock 
                                                                                                                       
inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering, he would not have the specific intent 
necessary to violate sections 2340-2340A.”). 
186.  Memorandum from Daniel Levin, supra note 104, at 16. 
187.  See Memorandum from Steven Bradbury, May 10, 2005, supra note 184, at 27–28. 
188.  Memorandum from Steven Bradbury, May 30, 2005, supra note 104, at 2–3. 
189.  Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 (1952); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
523 U.S. 833, 855 (1998). 
190.  See Memorandum from Steven Bradbury, May 30, 2005, supra note 104, at 16. 
191.  See id. at 27–28. 
192.  For arguments that the Department of Justice’s reasoning was swayed by improper 
influences and offered an inaccurate analysis, as well as a sudden and severe deviation from 
accepted legal doctrine, see, e.g., Cole, supra note 60 (arguing that the memos show evidence 
of a desire to insulate torturers from prosecution); Mark Danner, The Twilight of Responsibility: 
Torture and the Higher Deniability, 49 Houston L. Rev. 71, 79 (2012) (finding the memos 
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the conscience” standard—used to evaluate violations of the prohibition on cruel 
and unusual punishment as well as due process requirements—had long devolved 
into one that seemingly allowed absolutely any brutal treatment as long as some 
governmental interest could be cited in justification.193 Under this jurisprudence, 
liability will not be found to exist unless officials are malicious, sadistic, or 
deliberately indifferent.194 In other words, any amount of pain can be justified, 
based on a need to protect the public, or the official himself. 
As John Parry195 and Jerry Skolnick196 point out, the extreme evolution 
of the “shock the conscience” test was illustrated in the case of Chavez v. 
Martinez.197 That case, which arose in 1997 but was decided in 2003 before torture 
had reached the public eye, concerned the hospital interrogation of a crime suspect 
who had been shot several times, including in the face. The interrogation is 
memorialized in an audiotape, wherein the listener can plainly hear the suspect 
begging for the interrogation to stop and for a doctor to be brought in, as well as 
screaming, apparently in pain.198 
                                                                                                                       
dishonest and lacking credibility); Tung Yin, Great Minds Think Alike: The “Torture Memo,” 
Office of Legal Counsel, and Sharing the Boss’s Mindset, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 473 (2009) 
(arguing that the memos are flawed due to a desire to please a supervisor); David Luban, Legal 
Ethics and Human Dignity 176–80, 200–02 (2007) (describing legal ethics, the obligation to 
accurately state the law, and the failure of the Office of Legal Counsel to do so with respect to 
the question of torture); Frederick Schwarz Jr. & Aziz Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: 
Presidential Powers in a Time of Terror (2007) (describing why the Bush Administration’s legal 
analyses were “embarrassingly wrong”); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation 
of Law and Morals, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 67, 68 (2005) (“This is not legal analysis of which anyone 
could be proud.”). 
193.  See Dayan, supra note 6; see generally John Parry, “Just for Fun:” Understanding 
Torture and Understanding Abu Ghraib, 1 J. Nat. Sec. L. & Pol’y 253 (2005) (arguing that the 
“law in fact fails to regulate torture”); John Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive 
Interrogation, and Civil Rights Litigation after Chavez v. Martinez, 39 Ga. L. Rev. 733 (2005) 
(describing the “shock the conscience” standard as vague). 
194.  See Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 193; see also Whitley v. Albers, 
475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986) (holding that whether force used to quell violence in prison 
violated the Eighth Amendment depended on whether it was applied “maliciously and 
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm”); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 
(2003) (holding that whether force used in interrogating a witness violated the Eighth 
Amendment depended on whether the force was “unjustifiable by any government interest”). 
195.  See Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 193. 
196.  See Skolnick, supra note 113. 
197.  Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
198.  Id. at 784. Justice Stevens’ opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
includes an excerpt of the transcript, including, “Ay! What are you doing to me! No . . . ! 
[unintelligible scream].” The suspect, Oliverio Martinez, was never tried for any crime, but he 
did sue the officer involved for violating his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Id. 
at 764–65. Because he had not been charged with a crime, however, the Supreme Court found 
that he had no self-incrimination right to be violated. The brutality of the interrogation might 
have been a violation of due process, but the case had not been brought on that basis. Id. at 766 
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In dicta, six justices addressed the question of whether Martinez’s due 
process rights had been violated. Three of the justices specifically stated there was 
no such violation—as such a violation required conduct that is “unjustifiable by 
any government interest”.199 In other words, brutality was acceptable if it was 
necessary to fulfill some legitimate goal of government. Here, these justices found 
that the government’s interest in determining whether or not “there had been 
police misconduct constituted a justifiable government interest” because of the 
emergency situation in which the police found themselves. Had Martinez died 
before talking to police, evidence would have been irrevocably lost.200 Only three 
justices bothered to suggest that loss of evidence might not justify the type of 
violence the audiotape suggests.201 
In a brief for Chavez written in 2002, before the torture memos were 
complete or the use of torture by U.S. government agents had become a public 
scandal, the government cited Quarles as part of its argument that death threats, 
“grabbing of the throat,” (a clear reference to Leon) and threats of physical abuse 
would be justifiable if a bomb were “about to explode” and the police were 
“seeking life-saving information.”202 At oral arguments, the amount of abuse 
possible ascended to the level of beating a suspect with a rubber hose.203 
In fact, the ubiquity of the Quarles precedent highlights just how central 
that precedent and the public safety exception were to the question of police 
brutality in interrogating witnesses, and how well acknowledged that centrality 
was. Not only was the precedent discussed at oral arguments and relied on by the 
government, but also lawyers for Martinez cited the case and Leon v. Wainright.204 
This suggests that the public safety narrative was not merely the product of a 
desperate search for precedent, but was also an accepted aspect of U.S. law. 
The split in Chavez regarding these questions suggests that the 
prohibition on using physical abuse to obtain evidence in a situation where time 
is of the essence was up for debate in 2002 and 2003. It is precisely this 
interpretation that forms the basis of the Bradbury memo, and it is for this reason 
                                                                                                                       
(“We fail to see how . . . Martinez can allege a violation of [the Fifth Amendment], since 
Martinez was never prosecuted for a crime . . . .”). 
199.  Id. at 775. 
200.  Id. 
201.  Id. at 787–88 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 796–99 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg joined the relevant 
portions of Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Id. at 799 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). See also Parry, “Just for Fun,” supra note 193, at 273 (discussing the limited support 
in the Supreme Court for the notion that Martinez’s interrogation violated due process). 
202.  Seth Kreimer, Torture Lite, Full-Bodied Torture, and the Insulation of Legal 
Conscience, 1 J. Nat. Sec. L. & Policy 87, 206 n. 72 (2005). 
203.  Oral Argument, Chavez, 538 U.S. 760 (No. 01-1444), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1444. 
204.  Brief for the Petitioner at 27, 31, Chavez, 538 U.S. 760 (No. 01-1444). 
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that Bradbury discusses extensively the governmental interest in using brutal 
tactics to interrogate detainees. Bradbury describes the imminence and magnitude 
of the threat that interrogators (supposedly) encountered before resorting to these 
methods, and the care interrogators (supposedly) used in applying the 
techniques.205 Relying on the “shocks the conscience” standard, Bradbury makes 
his case that the CIA’s methods were not cruel and unusual, because they were 
called for in order to fulfill legitimate governmental interests.206 Indeed, Bradbury 
cites Chavez, claiming it was a more extreme interrogation than that planned by 
the CIA and suggesting that the Supreme Court found it was justified.207 Bradbury 
also highlights how much more legitimate the government’s national security 
interest must be Bradbury is not alone in thinking that the Chavez case illustrates 
just how low due process standards had sunk by the time of that decision. Legal 
scholars analyzing the application of the “shocks the conscience” test in Fifth and 
Eighth Amendment doctrines come to similar conclusions208 as does my own 
analysis above. 
The connection made by the government, both in the Chavez case and in 
Bradbury’s memo citing Chavez, between the legitimacy of brutal tactics and the 
search for vital information is precisely the connection made not only in Quarles, 
but in Krom, and Leon. Those cases similarly relied upon the notion that rather 
than an illegitimate purpose, namely seeking a confession, police were acting 
towards a legitimate government interest, seeking information. 
Indeed, the “shocks the conscience” limitation to “unjustifiable based on 
any governmental interest” is inherently connected to a division between the 
reactive and preventive functions of law enforcement. Actions that would be 
unacceptable as “punishment” (i.e., in the words of Leon, the “secondary role” of 
police that commences once a crime is completed and danger is past) are 
unquestioned as part of ongoing efforts to prevent future harms. 
D. Doctrine, Torture, and the Logic of Prevention 
I have already discussed how the logic of the ticking  
time-bomb scenario replicates the preventive logic of the precautionary principle, 
but it is worth noting the workings of the logic of prevention and the precautionary 
principle in the language of the courts and the textbooks themselves. 
                                                                                                                       
205.  Memorandum from Steven Bradbury, May 30, 2005, supra note 104, at 29–30. 
206.  Id. at 28. 
207.  Id. at 33.  
The CIA program is considerably less invasive than much of the conduct 
at issue in these cases. In addition, the government interest . . . at stake 
here: the national security—in particular, the protection of the United 
States . . . against attacks that may result in massive civilian casualties. 
208.  See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
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The precautionary principle is particularly evident in the discussion of 
kidnapping, and the removal of defendants’ protections in such cases. The cases 
discussed above offer varying levels of intrusion on defendants’ rights and 
varying levels of danger presented to the victim in the case. But the judges 
universally agree that, in a kidnapping case, no investigation into the level of 
threat presented is necessary.209 Instead, kidnapping qualifies as a type of crime 
that carries with it an immeasurable risk of high-level damage. Judges do not 
know, and do not ask, how likely it is that this kidnapper will kill this victim. 
Kidnappers sometimes kill their victims. Therefore, there is a known high-level 
risk, which makes analysis of its likelihood unnecessary.210 
In each of these cases police officers had good reason to believe they had 
a suspect with valuable information, with evidence ranging from the defendant 
stating he “might know something about it”211 to the apprehension of the suspect 
in the middle of a ransom transaction.212 But discussion of how much evidence is 
available is considered unnecessary to the broader ruling. Judges consider it 
sufficient to look at the evidence available (in the hindsight of reviewing a 
defendant who has confessed and whose confession has been corroborated) and 
state broadly that a life was in danger, without providing a concluding sentence 
that police officers had sufficient evidence to believe they had the offender in 
custody. 
Here, again, we see the disappearance of the question of law enforcement 
evaluations. The risk that emergency exceptions might pose to innocent suspects 
is not worthy of consideration, even where (as in Krom) judges appear conscious 
of the fact that they are creating or extending an exception to procedure that will 
carry forward into other cases. 
It is also worth noting that judges place these determinations squarely 
within the rubric of preventive criminal justice. In Krom, for instance, Judge 
Wachtler prioritized the preventive role of policing, stating that preventing crime 
was “a primary role of the police,” whereas apprehending suspects and gathering 
evidence was merely “secondary.”213 In Dean,214 Krom,215 and, notably, Leon, 
judges emphasized that the purpose of the interrogation, and brutality in the case 
                                                                                                                       
209.  See supra notes 124–136 and accompanying text. 
210.  It is once again worth noting the comparison to the case of the use of preventive 
solitary confinement of terrorists. There, as well, judges no longer bother to examine how likely 
individual defendants are to engage in the harm of which they are assumed to be capable. The 
mere fact that they are prosecuted for a certain type of crime that is associated with a high level 
of harm is sufficient to preventively detain them in the harshest conditions known in the criminal 
justice system. 
211.  People v. Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187, 193–94 (1984). 
212.  Leon, 410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. App. 1982). 
213.  Krom, 61 N.Y.2d at 198. 
214.  People v. Dean, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Cal. App. 1974). 
215.  Krom, 61 N.Y.2d at 198. 
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of Leon, was not to get a confession, but to save a life.216 In other words, the 
exception to the defendants’ protections was based on the fact that the purpose 
was not to gather evidence, but to prevent future harm from occurring. 
It is true that, other than Leon, these cases approved of purely procedural 
violations rather than physical abuse. However, this distinction disappeared as the 
cases moved into the realm of criminal procedure textbooks. There, the “public 
safety,” “rescue,” and/or “emergency” exceptions referenced the possibility that 
physical abuse might well be tolerable (in some textbooks more heavily than in 
others). 
Moreover, the omission of questions of the accuracy of police beliefs 
regarding the possible harm and the suspect’s guilt, and questions of the level of 
necessity of this interrogation in order to acquire the information, is even starker 
in textbooks. In fact, Kamisar et al. make no reference to the possibility that a 
suspect might be innocent, or that a life may not actually be at stake. “Should 
statements obtained in violation of Miranda be admissible if police interrogation 
of a suspected kidnapper is motivated primarily by a desire to save the victim’s 
life?” they ask, just prior to asking about the limits of those interrogations.217 That 
the interrogation should, and will, occur is supported by case law and 
scholarship.218 While it is true that at times the cases are not described, the case 
law cited consists of precisely those cases that similarly ignored the question of 
innocence.219 No opposing answer is given. Should a student choose to consider 
whether or not these violations are permissible, he or she will be directed towards 
an answer that the interrogation is proper, with no complication, debate, or doubts. 
The book goes on to discuss the possible limits of the extent of the 
interrogations.220 The questions of whether the victim’s life is in danger, whether 
the suspect is guilty, and how certain police are of those facts, are completely 
omitted. This structures students’ thought processes to look to questions of degree, 
rather than propriety, and to skip over doubts regarding whether any original 
(completely ignored) ignorance may be a concern. Motivation “by a desire to save 
the victim’s life” is sufficient, with no question as to the facts, or assumptions, 
underlying that desire. Moreover, the fact that the kidnapper is only “suspected” 
is quickly glossed over. 
In each of these ways, the precautionary principle shows its hold on U.S. 
criminal legal doctrine, and its reach into limitations on the treatment of persons 
suspected of having (possibly) life-saving information. The primary interest at 
stake is one of prevention of future harm. It is known that the future harm might 
                                                                                                                       
216.  Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d at 203; see also Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770, 773 
(11th Cir. 1984) (describing the purpose of the interrogation). 
217.  Kamisar, supra note 174, at 505. 
218.  Id. 
219.  Id. 
220.  Id. 
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be large, but its actual likelihood is unknown and irrelevant. The status of the 
suspect and the accuracy of the belief that he has relevant information are 
sufficiently irrelevant to be largely undiscussed. His moral guilt, which in other 
circumstances would be the basis for imposing upon his freedom, is irrelevant in 
light of the (possible but not definite) harm to be prevented. 
The evolution of the “shocks the conscience” standard shows the reach 
of the logic of prevention in criminal justice. While the most direct connection to 
the discourse of the ticking time bomb and the protection of public safety can be 
found in exceptions to Miranda, the logic is clearly present in other areas of 
criminal law and procedure. Typically, the use of torture in criminal justice would 
fall under a due process violation, rather than Miranda, as a violation in its own 
right. The Chavez discussion and the limitation of this protection to solely those 
violations that are done for purposes other than prevention attest to the 
prioritization of prevention. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE CRIMINAL ROOTS AND  
CRIMINAL FUTURE OF TORTURE 
The malleable and indeterminate nature of the law is well accepted in 
socio-legal scholarship.221 Particularly in times of extreme duress, the popular 
assumption is that law will have no force in the face of political will. The use of 
torture by the United States since 2001 is often discussed in this context as an 
example of the failure of legal norms, legal institutions, and the rule of law. In the 
wake of the terror attacks of 2001, it is claimed, “the unthinkable became 
thinkable,”222 and all prior norms were abandoned. 
But the above analysis demonstrates that torture was not nearly as 
unthinkable as these critics would like to believe. To the contrary, the 
circumstances in which torture would be acceptable was a subject of ongoing 
debate and consideration in the realm of criminal procedure. Nor was this debate 
limited to a few outlier judges, discussing scenarios they believed would never 
arise. To the contrary, it was present in the education of law students at schools 
across the country, and in cases that arose, seemingly, with some regularity. 
Most importantly, the notion of accepting torture in one of these 
circumstances was not presented as a ridiculous suggestion, to be rejected as far 
                                                                                                                       
221.  See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (1981) 
(arguing that courts, and therefore law, are influenced by political pressures); Judith Resnik, 
Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982) (explaining how judges are not distanced from 
cases but actively engage with litigants, and their rulings are influenced by those interactions as 
well as the law); Donald Black, Sociological Justice (1989) (arguing that law is a social process, 
influenced by social characteristics of judges and lawyers as well as litigants). 
222.  Jeremy Waldron, Torture, Terror, and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House 
222 (2010). 
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outside of the realms of legal limits. Instead, cases that were accepting of the use 
of physical abuse in order to obtain information in circumstances where a single 
life might be at stake were presented as accepted doctrine, thereby creating the 
assumption that an exception might be made in such a circumstance. 
The clearly preventive nature of the use of torture, and the preventive 
reasoning that was presented in cases and in textbooks to justify its use, as well as 
its appearance in standard criminal procedure debates, suggest that this logic was 
an outgrowth of the preventive turn in criminal law and procedure that began in 
the late 20th century. This suggestion has broad ramifications for scholars studying 
the use of torture and activists seeking to prevent it. 
Since 2001, the use of torture has been justified, consistently, in reliance 
on the exceptional nature of the threat of terrorism. There appears to be wide 
agreement that torture, if used, should only be used in extreme circumstances.223 
Among proponents of the use of torture the argument is that the threat of terrorism 
fits these circumstances. Indeed this is the very point of the ticking time-bomb 
hypothetical. In response, critics of the use of torture have focused on this 
hypothetical scenario as well, pointing to its flaws, suggesting that it is based on 
assumptions of facts that rarely, if ever, occur in real life, and arguing that it fails 
as a philosophical justification for torture, for those reasons. 
But the fact that justifications for torture originated in conventional 
criminal procedure shows the mistake of allowing the argument to be framed as a 
response to terrorism in the first place. In fact, the ticking time-bomb is merely a 
version of an earlier criminal procedural thought experiment. Far from 
exceptional reasoning, requiring “mission creep”224 to make its way into 
conventional criminal process, the use of torture is the realization of criminal 
procedural theory. Acceptance in criminal procedure is therefore not nearly so far 
off. 
Pigeonholing the discussion of torture in the context of terrorism has the 
same result as the ticking time bomb hypothetical itself does—it assumes that the 
question will arise only in the most extreme cases, where (as was the case, in the 
minds of government actors in the spring of 2002)225 there is some ultimate threat 
                                                                                                                       
223.  See, e.g., Paul Gronke et al., U.S. Public Opinion on Torture, 
 2001–2009, 43 Pol. Sci. & Pol. 437 (2010) (discussing public opinion polls on torture); see also 
Mark Danner, US Torture: Voices from the Black Sites, New York Review of Books, Apr. 9, 
2009, at 1, 23 (“Polls tend to show that a majority of Americans are willing to support torture 
only when they are assured that it will ‘thwart a terrorist attack.’”). 
224.  See, e.g., F.A.O. Schwartz, Jr., The Church Committee, Then and Now, in U.S. 
National Security, Intelligence, and Democracy: From the Church Committee to the War on 
Terror 22, 26 (Russell A. Miller ed. 2008) (warning of the risk of “mission creep,” the 
progression of intelligence activities against military or intelligence targets to use of those 
activities against civilians). 
225.  See 60 Minutes: Hard Measures (CBS television broadcast Apr. 29, 2012), 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hard-measures-ex-cia-head-defends-post-9-11-
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of nuclear weapons and at the very least multiple lives lost.226 This ignores the 
discussion of torture that is already ongoing in the federal courts and legal 
classrooms across the country, that reaches to circumstances where there is a 
possible (unconfirmed) threat to a single life, where police are acting on 
conventional detective work rather than overwhelming evidence provided by 
foreign intelligence surveillance, where all the normal caveats related to police 
behavior and government fallibility can and should apply. 
This does not contradict the criticisms lodged against the ticking time-
bomb hypothetical, that government intelligence may still be wrong, and that there 
is no way to know all the important factors that are presumed to be known in the 
hypothetical. Rather it exemplifies these criticisms. Allowing the discussion to 
remain in the context of the threat of terror allows scholars and the public to rely 
on the belief that multiple steps along the slippery slope will be necessary before 
we reach the application of this reasoning to conventional crime. This reliance is 
unfounded. We are already down the slippery slope. The discussion on allowing 
torture in conventional criminal cases is well underway and has been for decades. 
For example, in May of this year, an article was written citing a government 
source who claimed that “the world’s most notorious drug lord” had been found 
in December of 2013 by torturing a number of his subordinates.227 
Indeed, it seems it was this discussion that created the narrative that 
eventually justified the use of torture. This is an important point for those who are 
intent on eradicating the use of torture. If the prohibition on torture is to become 
truly absolute, it is in the conventional criminal domain that we must guard against 
exceptions and allowances for its use. A prohibition in the realm of international 
law will mean very little if our norms in the domestic sphere offer outlets and 
justifications for the use of torture. It may be wise, rather than guarding against 
the use of torture in exceptional circumstances, to more quickly credit the threat 
of the slippery slope in the everyday world of criminal justice norms. It is to these 
norms that our imagination jumps when the exceptional circumstance appears. 
  
                                                                                                                       
tactics/; see also Jay S. Bybee, Classified Response to the U.S. Department of Justice Office of 
Professional Responsibility 15 (2009), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/opr-
bybeefinal.pdf (describing the belief of the intelligence community that hundreds of American 
lives would be lost if interrogations did not continue). 
226.  Of course, basing a justification of torture on the loss of multiple lives leaves one 
to wonder whether similar measures would be justified in order to prevent, for instance, school 
shootings or other mass killing events. 
227.  Patrick R. Keefe, The Hunt for El Chapo: How the World’s Most Notorious Drug 
Lord was Captured, New Yorker, May 5, 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/05/the-hunt-for-el-chapo?currentPage=allNew 
(suggesting that information had come from informants who had been tortured by Mexican 
authorities). 
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APPENDIX A:  
Most Adopted Criminal Procedure Textbooks, 2003, in order  of 
common usage, highest to lowest (from Bibas, 2003): 
 
ADOPTIONS | TEXT 
 
56 YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL   
 PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND    
 QUESTIONS  (2000) 
40 WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ,   
 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL   
 CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND   
 PROOF (2001) 
38 NEIL P. COHEN & DONALD J. HALL, CRIMINAL  
  PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE   
  PROCESS CASES AND MATERIALS (2000) 
37 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA,  
  AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND  
 COMMENTARY (2000) 
35  RONALD JAY ALLEN, WILLIAM STUNTZ, JOSEPH  
 HOFFMANN, DEBRA LIVINGSTON, & ANDREW   
 LEIPOLD, COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL    
 PROCEDURE (2001) 
34 MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT,   
  CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES,   
 AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS (1998) 
34 JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III,  
  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES  
  AND PERSPECTIVES (1999) 
 
